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Supreme Court Economic Review Symposium on
Post-Kelo Reform

Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers,
Local Governments, and Impermissible
Favoritism
Daniel B. Kelly*

Since Kelo v. City of New London, the preferred litigation
strategy for challenging a condemnation that benefits a
private party is to allege that the taking is “pretextual.”
This Article contends that, although pretextual takings are
socially undesirable, the current judicial test for identifying
such takings is problematic. Yet an alternative, intent-based
test might be impracticable, as well as underinclusive: condemnors often have mixed motives, particularly when confronted with a firm’s credible threat to relocate. Instead, the
Article develops a framework that emphasizes informational
differences between local governments and private developers. When the government lacks information regarding the
optimal site for an assembly, the government may need to
rely on a private party to identify, as well as develop, a particular site. However, when the government itself possesses
information regarding the site, pre-condemnation private
involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement by
a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Such involvement increases the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without
any corresponding public benefit. The Article concludes that
a burden-shifting framework, analogous to Title VII’s test for
identifying pretext, can be adopted in the takings context.
The new framework is then applied to several situations in
which allegations of pretext are likely to arise.
* Terence M. Considine Research Fellow in Law and Economics and Lecturer on
Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Notre Dame
(dkelly@post.harvard.edu). I thank Robert Ellickson, Thomas Merrill, Steven Shavell,
and Ilya Somin for helpful suggestions. I also am grateful to the Thomas W. Smith
© 2009 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0-226-11240-3/2009/0017-0006$10.00
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London,1 the underlying assumption of Kelo’s critics, as well as its
defenders, has been that, when compared with Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, the opinion of the Court is less protective of private
property rights. In at least one respect, however, the Court’s opinion
arguably is more protective of property rights than O’Connor’s dissent. Whereas O’Connor appeared to suggest that the government’s
motivation for a taking is irrelevant, the Court acknowledged the
possibility that a condemnation might violate the Public Use Clause
of the Fifth Amendment if its purpose was pretextual.2
Although Kelo is the first eminent domain case in which the Court
considered this issue of pretext,3 the Court failed to provide much
guidance. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens briefly mentioned
two reasons for concluding that the takings at issue were not pretextual: the condemnations “would be executed pursuant to a carefully
considered development plan” and “the identities of th[e] private
parties were not known when the plan was adopted.”4 In a concur-

Foundation, the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard
Law School, and Yale Law School, where I completed most of the work on this Article
as an Olin Fellow, for research support.
1
545 US 469 (2005) (holding that a city’s use of eminent domain to transfer property
from one private party to another private party does not violate the Public Use Clause
of the Fifth Amendment—“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation”—if the condemnation may have an incidental public benefit of
promoting economic development).
2
Compare id at 478 (Stevens) (asserting that a city would not be allowed “to take
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to
bestow a private benefit” (emphasis added)) with id at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (“If
it is true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure the
‘public purpose’ in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is
concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place?”).
3
See Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 61 (2d Cir 2008) (“Prior to Kelo, no Supreme
Court decision had endorsed the notion of a ‘pretext’ claim . . . .”) The term “pretext”
did appear in West River Bridge Co v Dix, 47 US 507 (1848), but the reference is merely
a quotation from Kent’s Commentaries, id at 519 (quoting 2 Kent’s Comm 340).
4
Kelo, 545 US at 478 & n 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice
Stevens also cited one case, 99 Cents Only Stores v Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001), for the proposition that “a one-to-one transfer of
property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan . . . would
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot . . . .” Kelo, 545 US at 487
& n 17. However, because the condemnation in 99 Cents Only did occur pursuant
to a development plan the discussion of pretext proved to be ambiguous as well as
brief. 99 Cents Only, 237 F Supp 2d at 1125; see Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping
Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 S Ct Econ Rev 183, 236 (2007)
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ring opinion, Justice Kennedy indicated that his agreement with the
Court did not “foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . . might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn
category of takings.”5 Kennedy highlighted two additional factors,
the expected public benefits of the project and the city’s compliance
with procedural requirements, in concluding that a “more demanding” standard was inappropriate for a case like Kelo.6 However, it is
unclear whether each of these four factors (or perhaps some combination of them) is determinative or even whether these factors should
be determinative.7
Notwithstanding the general backlash against eminent domain
since Kelo,8 the specific issue of pretext has received relatively little
legislative attention. Only one state, Georgia, mentioned “pretext”
in its statutory law before Kelo.9 Only two others, Texas and Idaho,
enacted similar provisions after Kelo.10 Yet even the statutes in these
three states merely indicate that pretextual takings are prohibited;
they do not provide any criterion by which a taking might be identi(noting that “even . . . the case that Stevens’ opinion cites as a paradigmatic example
of impermissible favoritism” involved a plan).
5
Kelo, 545 US at 493 (Kennedy concurring).
6
Overall, Kennedy emphasized that (i) ”the projected economic benefits of the
project cannot be characterized as de minimis”; (ii) ”the taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan”; (iii) “[t]he city complied with elaborate
procedural requirements”; and (iv) “[t]he identities of most of the private beneficiaries
were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.” Id.
7
See Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 169 (DC 2007) (suggesting that “the Supreme Court’s decision may raise many more questions than it
answers”); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 Sup Ct Rev 103, 120 (asserting that Kennedy’s factors “raise more
questions than they answer about when departure from the rational basis framework
might be warranted”).
8
See Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State
Responses to Kelo, 17 S Ct Econ Rev 237 (2009) (“In the two years after the June 23,
2005 decision, legislation to restrict eminent domain powers was introduced in fortysix states, with multiple bills in many states, and forty-two states enacted legislation
or constitutional amendments restricting the use of eminent domain.”).
9
See Ga Code Ann, § 22-1-3 (“It is the province of the General Assembly to determine when the right of eminent domain may be exercised. If, however, under pretext
of such necessity the General Assembly should pass a law authorizing the taking of
property for private use rather than for public use, the courts should declare the law
inoperative.”).
10
See Texas SB 7 (Sept. 1, 2005) (“A governmental or private entity may not take
private property through the use of eminent domain if the taking . . . is for a public use
that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefit on a particular private party . . . .”);
Idaho HB 555 (Mar. 21, 2006) (“Eminent domain shall not be used to acquire private
property . . . [f]or any alleged public use which is merely a pretext for the transfer of the
condemned property or any interest in that property to a private party . . . .”).
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fied as pretextual. In light of the Court’s holding that the particular
condemnations at issue were not pretextual,11 the Court’s reluctance
to articulate a clear test for determining whether a taking is pretextual, and the dissent’s skepticism about whether pretext is even relevant, a more robust legislative response may have been warranted.12
The legislatures’ lack of attention, coupled with the Court’s lack
of clarity, has created significant uncertainty for both litigants and
lower courts. In several post-Kelo cases, litigants have attempted to
invoke the Court’s reference to “pretext” in challenging condemnations that allegedly benefit private parties.13 However, in deciding
these cases, lower courts have relied on a number of different analytical frameworks and reached a number of different substantive
conclusions. There are disagreements about whether a condemnor’s
motivation matters; whether, if motivation does matter, there are
ways for courts to identify it; what the Supreme Court’s “test” for
pretext actually requires; and whether, and to what extent, the various factors in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence should be utilized as
persuasive authority.14 Yet, despite this uncertainty, it is unlikely
that the Supreme Court will provide further clarification in the near
future.
In this Article, I propose a new framework for evaluating whether
a taking is pretextual. In Part II, I examine whether pretextual takings
are, in fact, problematic. I contend that unlimited private involvement may result in a number of problems including corruption,
secondary rent seeking, and threats to relocate, each of which may
increase the likelihood of undesirable transfers.15 I also consider three
of the most significant arguments against judicial consideration of
See Kelo, 545 US at 478 (holding that “the City’s development plan was not
adopted ‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals’ ” (quoting Hawaii
Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 245 (1984)).
12
A few states did enact procedural reforms aimed at reducing the likelihood of
abuse. See, for example, Minn SF 2750 (May 19, 2006) (requiring a public hearing and
a resolution describing, inter alia, the “public costs and benefits”). These reforms may
increase, what Thomas Merrill has called, the “due process costs” of eminent domain.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 87 (1986). Yet
procedural requirements only address the issue of pretext indirectly. See Part III(A)(2).
13
See, for example, Goldstein, 516 F3d 50; Franco, 930 A2d 160; Middletown Township v Lands of Stone, 939 A2d 331 (Pa 2007); 49 WB, LLC v Village of Haverstraw, 44
AD3d 226 (NY App Div 2007); Didden v Village of Port Chester, 2006 US App LEXIS
8653, 2006 WL 898093 (2d Cir 2006).
14
Cf. Kelo, 545 US at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s opinion for
not “detailing how courts are to conduct th[e] complicated inquiry” into pretextual
motivation and Kennedy’s concurrence for not “specifying what courts should look
for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what
to do if they do not”).
15
See Part II(A).
11
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pretext: disutility, futility, and judicial administrability.16 I conclude
that implementing a framework for evaluating pretext is likely to be
worthwhile only if these objections can be overcome.
In Part III, I identify several problems with the current test, as
articulated in the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo and the
subsequent decisions of lower federal and state courts.17 I then suggest why one plausible alternative, a test based on the condemnor’s
motivation, is impracticable, as well as underinclusive.18 The shortcomings of these tests suggest the need for a different approach.
In Part IV, I outline a new approach based on the comparative competencies of public and private actors. I first point out that assembly
projects actually involve two distinct stages, identification of the
assembly site and development of the assembly site.19 I then contend that, because private parties play a different role at each stage,
a local government may need to rely on private parties for certain
types of takings but not others.20 Specifically, when the government
itself has information regarding the optimal site, pre-condemnation
private involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement
by a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Under these
circumstances, the expected costs of private involvement almost
certainly outweigh its potential benefits. By contrast, when the
government does not have information regarding the optimal site,
pre-condemnation private involvement may be necessary to identify
the site. In these situations, allocating development rights through
auctions or other competitive mechanisms aimed at reducing the
likelihood of pretext might eliminate the incentive for certain developers to reveal socially useful information.
In Part V, I suggest that either legislatures or courts might implement this theory on either the state or federal level by adopting a
burden-shifting test similar to the framework for identifying pretext
in adverse employment actions under Title VII.21 I illustrate how
this framework might apply in the takings context by considering
condemnations in blighted areas as well as situations involving redevelopment districts, new assemblies, positive externalities, changed
circumstances, one-to-one transfers, and “same-use” takings.22
Finally, in Part VI, I conclude with several predictions regarding
the likely role of pretextual analysis in eminent domain law. I mainSee Part II(B).
See Part III(A).
18
See Part III(B).
19
See Part IV(A).
20
See Part IV(B).
21
See Part V(A).
22
See Part V(B).
16
17

This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

178

Pretextual Takings

tain that a failure to develop a coherent jurisprudence of pretext could
result in excessive judicial deference or excessive judicial discretion,
either of which might exacerbate the public’s reaction against Kelo.
I I . D E S I R A B I L I T Y O F TA R G E T I N G
PRETEXT
A. Risks of Private Involvement
Allowing unlimited private involvement in the eminent domain process raises a number of potential concerns.23 First, private involvement may increase the risk of corruption and inordinate influence.
Certain private parties may use side payments, bribes, kickbacks,
lobbyists, and campaign contributions to encourage local officials to
approve takings that are not in the public interest.24 While taxpayers

23
Elsewhere, I have argued that the necessity of utilizing eminent domain on behalf
of private parties may be overstated: private parties, unlike the government, often
can overcome strategic holdouts without relying on eminent domain. See generally
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L Rev 1, 18-33
(2006); see also Robert C. Ellickson and Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and
Materials 845-54 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed 2005) (discussing ability of private firms to
assemble land without resorting to eminent domain). In the discussion that follows,
I assume that private involvement does have certain advantages and that, at least in
certain circumstances, the advantages of private involvement outweigh any potential
disadvantages. This assumption is plausible for three reasons. First, eminent domain
traditionally has been utilized for certain types of private takings, including assembling land for railroads, in which the holdout problem is particularly acute. See Kelly,
92 Cornell L Rev at 59-61 (cited in this note); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 Harv L Rev 31, 93-94 (2004) (discussing use of eminent domain for “private
firms, such as railroads and pipeline companies”). Second, even in situations in which
the holdout problem is arguably less problematic, private parties may be more effective than the government at developing a previously assembled site. See Kelo v City
of New London, 545 US 469, 486 (2005) (quoting Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 33-34
(1954)). Third, under the current state of the law, almost all states, including most of
the states that have enacted post-Kelo reforms, continue to permit private involvement in a number of circumstances. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn L Rev 2100, 2103-04 (2009) (reviewing post-Kelo legislation and concluding that “the majority of the newly enacted postKelo laws are likely to be ineffective” in preventing private takings).
24
See Gideon Kanner, We Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning—Sorry
About That, Justice Stevens, 39 Urb Law 529, 537-38 (2007) (pointing out that “municipal functionaries are often unduly influenced or even controlled by private interests
that, apart from instances of outright corruption, gain influence in city hall by means
of political connections and campaign contributions, which are often the mother’s
milk of municipal politics”); Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and
Public-Private Economic Redevelopment, 34 Ecology L Q 1, 58 (2007) (asserting that
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who pay just compensation bear a relatively diffuse cost, private parties that benefit from the use of eminent domain obtain a relatively
concentrated benefit.25 This concentrated benefit creates an incentive for parties to pursue the use of eminent domain even when a taking may not be consistent with the public interest.26 A condemnation
process that avoids the appearance of corruption is also likely to be
superior, all other things being equal, to a process that does not.27
Second, unlimited private involvement may lead to the problem
of secondary rent seeking. If the value of several parcels as assembled
is greater than the value of the parcels if fragmented, assembling
the parcels through eminent domain creates a surplus. Assuming
the condemnees receive fair market value (or even their subjective
value) as just compensation, this surplus inures to the benefit of the
condemnor.28 Yet, as Thomas Merrill has pointed out, “allocating the
condemnation’s entire surplus to the condemnor . . . may produce
a kind of secondary rent seeking of its own, as competing interest
groups attempt to acquire or defeat a legislative grant of the power
of eminent domain.”29 Private efforts to capture eminent domain
or oppose its use constitute a social waste, and, in certain circumstances, the costs of such efforts may exceed the benefits of the as“the process is in fact susceptible to corruption, a concern, however, that arises not so
much from this public-private partnership as it does from the intrinsic role financial
support of political candidates plays in the current electoral process”); Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 Hofstra L Rev 13, 16 (2005) (noting that
a “big-box store owner, which expects to benefit from siting within the locality, will
care a lot, enough to attempt to invest heavily in lobbying local officials to approve the
condemnation”); cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 308-09 (cited in note 23)
(discussing corruption in land use planning)
25
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 34-35 (cited in note 23).
26
See id at 37.
27
See Richard Brooks, Kelo and the “Whaling City”: A Search for the Urban Public
Interest, 35 Real Est L J 223, 237 (2006) (noting that the “close relationship between
public and private . . . can also serve to delegitimize public urban development efforts
if it is perceived to be merely an instrument of private interests”); cf. Buckley v Valeo,
424 US 1, 27 (1976) (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.”).
28
See, for example, United States v Miller, 317 US 369, 375 (1943); see also David A.
Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous Economics,
and The Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 Vt L Rev 129, 139 (2007) (noting that,
“in the case of covert assembly, landowners are also denied any of the value that may
result from successful assembly”).
29
Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 86 (cited in note 12); see also Gregory S. Alexander,
Eminent Domain and Secondary Rent-Seeking, 1 NYU J L & Liberty 958, 959 (2005)
(defining secondary rent seeking as “efforts by interest groups to acquire (or defeat) a
legislative grant of eminent domain” (citing Merrill)).
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sembly.30 Rent seeking is thus a distinct possibility whenever a private party expects to obtain all or a significant portion of a taking’s
surplus.31
Third, the possibility of private involvement in the condemnation
process may lead private parties to threaten to relocate unless the
local government condemns land on their behalf. Companies that
provide towns or cities with substantial tax revenue and that are
capable of moving to other locations know that such threats are credible. But these types of threats are problematic: they may pressure
local officials to use eminent domain even though, in the absence
of the threat, officials would not deem the taking to be in the public
interest. Two examples from the cases illustrate this problem.
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,32 General
Motors Corporation (GM) threatened to relocate one of its factories
if the City of Detroit did not provide a suitable site for a new factory.33 The City, concerned that GM might decide to build its factory
elsewhere, agreed to condemn several hundred acres under the state’s
“quick take” statute.34 Although it analyzed nine different sites as
possible options, the City ultimately selected Poletown, a residential
neighborhood that matched all of GM’s specifications.35 The rest
30
See Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 Idaho L Rev 11, 50 (2003) (pointing out that “if the surplus produced
by a government action can be distributed disproportionately, then people will waste
resources trying to capture as much of this surplus as possible”); see also Nathan Burdsal, Note, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J Pub L 79, 90 (2005)
(noting that “landowners engage in rent-seeking by trying to maximize the gain that
they receive from society even when the gain creates social waste”).
31
See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 87 (cited in note 12) (noting that “eminent
domain is most likely to foster secondary rent-seeking behavior . . . where one or a
small number of persons will capture a taking’s surplus”); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 Mich L Rev 101, 139
(2006) (pointing out “would-be beneficiaries of an economic development taking have
a substantial incentive to engage in rent-seeking”).
32
304 NW2d 455 (Mich 1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004).
33
See id 460 (Fitzgerald dissenting) (“In the spring of 1980, General Motors Corporation informed the City of Detroit that it would close its Cadillac and Fisher Body
plants located within the city in 1983. General Motors offered to build an assembly
complex in the city, if a suitable site could be found.”); see also Douglas W. Kmiec,
Book Review, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magisterial History
of James W. Ely, Jr., 52 Vand L Rev 737, 758 (1999) (noting that the Poletown condemnations occurred “in order to avert General Motors’ threatened partial departure from
Detroit”).
34
Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 NW2d at 461 (Fitzgerald dissenting).
35
Id at 460; see also Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
Harv L Rev 1465, 1510 (2008) (citing Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power 74-76 (U Press of Kansas,
1986)).
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of the story is familiar: the Michigan Supreme Court approved the
City’s use of eminent domain, and thousands of people lost their
homes and businesses, while the GM factory ultimately produced
fewer jobs and less tax revenue than the City had projected.36
More recently, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,37 Costco “threatened to relocate” one of its supermarkets unless the City of Lancaster provided it with additional retail
space.38 Although the owner of the shopping center in which Costco
leased its store had advised the City of Lancaster that Costco could
expand behind 99 Cents Only, Costco “demanded” that it be allowed
to expand directly into the adjacent site then occupied by 99 Cents.39
Lancaster, “fearful of Costco’s relocation to another city,” began
negotiating with the shopping center’s owner to purchase the lease
for Costco’s preferred parcel.40 When negotiations failed, the City
authorized the condemnation of the lease.41 Unlike in Poletown, the
court held that the taking at issue was unconstitutional because “the
very reason that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents’ leasehold
interest was to appease Costco.”42
Overall, private involvement in the takings process entails a number of problems: the possibility of actual or perceived corruption,
the existence of secondary rent seeking, and the issuance of threats
to relocate. These problems suggest that private involvement may
result in certain takings that advance a particular private interest but
that are not necessarily in the public interest. If so, a rule allowing
unlimited private involvement may be inferior to a rule allowing
private involvement for certain types of takings but not others. In
the analysis thus far, however, I have assumed that the process of
identifying pretextual takings would be costless. In the next section,
I relax this assumption.
B. Problems with Pretextual Analysis
The costs of permitting unlimited private involvement also can be
viewed as the benefits of scrutinizing a taking for pretextual motivation. Yet a screening mechanism for pretext is only able to realize
these benefits in an ideal world where a condemnor’s motivation is
See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 194-95 (cited in note 4).
237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001).
38
Id at 1126.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id; see also id at 1129 (“No judicial deference is required . . . where the ostensible
public use is demonstrably pretextual.” (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F3d 1311,
1321 (9th Cir 1996) (en banc)).
36
37
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immediately apparent. In reality, determining whether a taking is for
a public purpose or whether the asserted purpose is a “mere pretext”
for a private objective is extremely difficult. Here, I focus on three
potential problems with considering motivation: disutility, futility,
and administrability.43
Permitting courts to analyze pretext means that a court may strike
down a governmental action because of its underlying motivation.44
As one might expect, an action that is invalidated on the basis of
impermissible motivation is often detrimental to social welfare.
However, an action may be invalidated on the basis of motivation
even though the action itself is socially beneficial. The effect of
invalidating a beneficial action solely on the basis of the underlying
motivation is a loss of utility or “disutility.”
It is easy see how the problem of disutility applies in the takings
context. Evaluating whether a certain use of eminent domain is
pretextual means that a taking might be invalidated even though
a forced transfer would have increased social welfare. The Supreme
Court seemingly has embraced this position in asserting that “it has
long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of
A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B,
even though A is paid just compensation.”45 Under this doctrine, a
taking whose purpose is to transfer a certain property to B would be
unconstitutional even if a local government could demonstrate with
metaphysical certainty that B valued the property more than A.
Allowing courts to analyze motivation also may lead to the problem of “futility.” Futility refers to a court’s inability to prevent governmental actions that are based on impermissible motivations because of the government’s ability to circumvent judicial scrutiny.
For example, government officials can hide their actual motivations,
including pretextual ones. Moreover, even if a court detects an impermissible motivation and invalidates a governmental action on
that basis, officials may decide to take the same action without disSee generally John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L J 1205, 1212-17 (1970) (discussing these three problems).
44
For present purposes, I use the terms “purpose,” “motive,” “intent,” and “motivation” interchangeably, although I primarily use the term “motivation.” See id at
1207 n 1 (noting that, while “purpose” and “motive” are terms more commonly used,
motivation may have less connotative baggage); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Public
Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent
Domain Law, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 45, 56, 58-61 (2008) (discussing the judicial use
of the terms “motive,” “purpose,” and “motivation” in the condemnation context).
But cf. Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 173 (DC 2007) (“The
terms ‘purpose,’ ‘motive,’ and ‘intent’ sometimes are used (imprecisely) as if they were
interchangeable.”).
45
Kelo, 545 US at 477.
43
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closing their actual motivation, thereby circumventing the judicial
test.
Again, it is easy to see how this problem of futility might arise
in the takings context. Suppose that a development corporation approves a condemnation that provides a significant benefit to a particular developer. Local officials might attempt to hide their actual
motivation—benefiting the developer—by asserting a pretextual justification such as increasing the city’s tax revenue.46 But even if the
officials reveal their true motivation, the condemnees seek injunctive relief, and the court holds that the asserted purpose is pretextual, the development corporation could simply approve the same
condemnation without revealing the taking’s actual purpose. If the
condemnations are challenged again and if the court now upholds the
takings, the court’s original holding—that the condemnations were
pretextual—turns out to be futile.
Perhaps even more troublesome is the problem of judicial administrability. Motivation, especially the motivation of government
officials, is extremely difficult to establish.47 A member of a state
legislature does not necessarily reveal what is motivating a particular
decision. Moreover, even when a legislator makes a statement that is
indicative of her underlying motivation, that motivation may not be
the same as the motivations of her fellow legislators.48
This administrability problem arises in the takings context as well.
It is difficult to know the precise reason that a particular member
of a development corporation votes to authorize the use of eminent
domain. The member may genuinely believe that the development of
a particular site will benefit the public.49 Alternatively, the member
may favor a private interest that will profit from the project. Yet,
even in the unlikely event that a development corporation member
46
Cf. Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61 (cited in note 44) (concluding that “even
a condemnor, with clearly improper motives can, with a little effort and forethought,
articulate a facially valid purpose for the taking and one which is relatively easy and
relatively inexpensive to effectuate”).
47
See id at 58 (“Judicial reluctance to inquire into the motives underlying legislative actions (of any type, not just condemnations) is driven by the difficulty of assessing such motives.”).
48
See United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 384 (1968) (Warren, CJ) (“What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork.”).
49
Cf. Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 239 (cited in note 4) (pointing out that local government officials who assert that public benefits are their true motivation “will not
always be disingenuous” because “local government officials and the private interest
groups they promote are likely to genuinely believe that policies that serve their political and economic self-interest also advance the public good”).
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declares her motivation, it is nearly impossible to know whether that
member’s motivation is representative of the other members’ motivations.50
Overall, while targeting pretext has a number of distinct benefits,51 it also involves several costs including the potential problems
of disutility, futility, and administrability. A framework for analyzing
pretext is only practicable (and, indeed, desirable) if these problems
can be eliminated or, at least, mitigated. But if the issue ultimately
is an empirical question that entails weighing the expected benefits and costs of private involvement, courts will continue to defer
to condemnors even in those cases involving credible allegations of
pretext.52 The objective, then, is to design a test that captures the
benefits of targeting pretext while avoiding the potential costs.53
I I I . D I F F I C U LT I E S O F D E S I G N I N G
A TEST
A. The Current Test Based on Kelo
The current test for identifying whether a taking is “pretextual” is
less than clear. Some courts have focused on the magnitude of the
condemnation’s projected public benefits. Other courts have investigated whether the taking is part of a comprehensive development
plan or whether the condemnor satisfies certain procedural requirements. Still others have examined whether the potential private
Cf. Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 63 (2d Cir 2008) (“Beyond being conclusory,
the claim that the ‘decision to take Plaintiffs’ properties serves only one purpose’
defies both logic and experience. ‘Legislative decisions to invoke the power to condemn are by their nature political accommodations of competing concerns.’ ” (quoting
Brody v Village. of Port Chester, 434 F3d 121, 136 (2d Cir 2005))).
51
See Part II(A).
52
See Kelo, 545 US at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.”); id at 503 (O’Connor dissenting) (“The Court rightfully admits . . . that the
judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public
will actually be better off after a property transfer.”); see also Goldstein, 516 F3d at
64-65 (“At the end of the day, we are left with the distinct impression that the lawsuit is animated by concerns about the wisdom of the Atlantic Yards Project and its
effect on the community. . . . [S]uch matters of policy are the province of the elected
branches, not this Court.”).
53
For a contrary approach in which the proper scope of private involvement is
determined through negotiations between public agencies and private developers, see
Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 40-41 (cited in note 24) (“Public-private negotiations strive
to determine the most efficient actors for each development function at each stage in
the life of a project.”).
50
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beneficiaries are identifiable at the time of the development plan’s
adoption. Because these three factors—the magnitude of public benefits, the extensiveness of government planning and process, and the
identification of private beneficiaries—are the primary factors discussed in the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo, as well as in
the subsequent case law, I discuss each of them in turn.
1. Magnitude of Public Benefits
While the Court itself did not mention whether the magnitude of
public benefits is relevant for identifying pretext, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence emphasized that “[a] court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that,
by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party,
with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”54 Kennedy also
noted that one of the reasons that the condemnations at issue in Kelo
were not subject to a more demanding level of scrutiny was that “the
projected economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as
de minimis.”55 Unfortunately, Kennedy did not provide any criterion
by which to determine whether a taking’s benefits are “incidental”
or “de minimis.” As an initial matter, therefore, it is unclear what
the threshold is for declaring that a condemnation’s public benefits
are so small that the condemnation itself is pretextual.56
Nevertheless, several post-Kelo decisions have focused on the magnitude of public benefits as an important, and perhaps decisive, factor.57 In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corporation, the
54
Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added); see also id. (“As the trial court in this case was correct to observe, ‘Where
the purpose [of a taking] is economic development and that development is to be carried out by private parties or private parties will be benefited, the court must decide if
the stated public purpose—economic advantage to a city sorely in need of it—is only
incidental to the benefits that will be confined on private parties of a development
plan.’” (quoting App to Pet for Cert 263) (emphasis added)).
55
Id at 493.
56
This ambiguity is amplified because, by using the phrase “incidental or pretextual benefits,” id at 491 (emphasis added), Kennedy appears to be making a distinction
between incidental benefits and pretextual benefits. Such a distinction might imply
that a taking could result in incidental benefits that are not pretextual or, alternatively, pretextual benefits that are not incidental.
57
See, for example, Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160,
173-74 (DC 2007); see also Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 58 (2d Cir 2008) (“[T]he
instant complaint calls the ‘alleged “public benefits” . . . either wildly exaggerated
or simply false. At best, [they] are incidental; at worst, they are nonexistent.’ Read
carefully, however, the specific allegations in the complaint foreclose any blanket
suggestion that the Project can be expected to result in no benefits to the public.”
(second alteration in original)).
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District of Columbia’s development corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against Samuel Franco, the owner of a “Discount
Mart” store.58 In analyzing Franco’s defenses, the court explained that
“Kelo makes clear that there is room for a landowner to claim that
the legislature’s declaration of a public purpose is a pretext designed
to mask a taking for private purposes.”59 Ultimately, the D.C. Court
of Appeals held that “Franco adequately pled such a defense”60 and
thus remanded the case to the trial court.61 In remanding the case,
the court endorsed Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the magnitude of
public benefits and also proposed a distinction between “substantial”
and “incidental” benefits.62 But, like Kennedy, the court did not offer
any criterion for determining whether benefits are “substantial” or
“incidental” or for evaluating the “[h]arder cases” that lie “between
these extremes.”63
In theory, a test that relied on the magnitude of public benefits
could be useful. If the public benefits of a taking were relatively large,
then a court might conclude that such benefits outweigh the risk of
impermissible favoritism. Suppose, for example, that an independent
analyst estimated that the public benefits of a condemnation would
include 500 new jobs, $4 million in additional tax revenue, and 200
units of affordable housing. The court might conclude that, notwithstanding the possibility that the actual purpose of the taking may be
to benefit a private developer, the magnitude of the public benefits
justifies private involvement. Alternatively, if the public benefits of
a taking were relatively small, then a court might conclude that the
risk of favoritism outweighs any potential public benefits. Suppose,
for example, that an analyst estimated that the public benefits of a
condemnation would include 5 new jobs, $40,000 in tax revenue,
and 2 units of affordable housing. The court might conclude that,
930 A2d at 162. Four private corporations had prepared a plan to redevelop the
site into a “first-class, quality mixed-use retail center,” id at 163, and a committee of
the D.C. Council approved findings that the existing shopping center was a “blighting
factor,” id. Franco raised a number of defenses and counterclaims including a defense
that “the declared reason for the taking was pretextual and that the true purpose was
to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.” Id at 164.
59
Id at 171.
60
Id at 172.
61
Id at 176.
62
Id at 173-74 (“We conclude that a reviewing court must focus primarily on benefits the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking. If the property is being transferred to another private party, and the benefits to the public are only ‘incidental’ or
‘pretextual,’ a ‘pretext defense may well succeed.’ On the other hand, if the record
discloses (in the words of the trial court) that the taking will serve ‘an overriding public
purpose’ and that the proposed development ‘will provide substantial benefits to the
public,’ the courts must defer to the judgment of the legislature.”).
63
Id at 174.
58
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notwithstanding these benefits, private involvement is not justified
because of the countervailing risk that the taking’s asserted purpose is pretextual. The only question then would be distinguishing
between public benefits that are “substantial” and those that are
“incidental.”
The public benefits test, however, suffers from several additional
shortcomings. By focusing only on the magnitude of public benefits, the test seems to ignore the magnitude of private benefits. Yet
private benefits seem relevant. Suppose that an assembly project is
expected to add 50 new jobs, $400,000 in tax revenue, and 20 units of
affordable housing. If landowners challenged the local government’s
use of eminent domain to assemble the land, a court might reject
a pretext defense if the private developer was expected to obtain a
benefit of only $10,000. However, a court could, and probably should,
view the case differently if the developer was expected to obtain a
benefit of $1 million. But neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Kennedy
mentions the magnitude of private benefits as a potential factor. As
a result, two takings with the same expected public benefits presumably would be judged similarly even though they differ dramatically
with regard to the expected private benefits.
Perhaps an even more fundamental problem with the public benefits test is that the test relies on “projected” public benefits. In Kelo,
Justice Kennedy focused on the fact that the “projected economic
benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimis.”64
Likewise, in Franco, the D.C. Court of Appeals emphasized that “a
reviewing court must focus primarily on the benefits the public hopes
to realize from the proposed taking.”65 A test based on projected benefits is likely to prove vacuous in most circumstances. Not only is
it extremely difficult to estimate a project’s expected benefits,66 but
both the condemnor and the private beneficiaries of a condemnation
have an incentive to inflate projected benefits to insulate the condemnation from scrutiny.67 Consequently, for almost any assembly
545 US at 491 (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added).
930 A2d at 173-74 (emphasis added).
66
See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 202 (cited in note 4) (pointing out that “the calculation of the costs and benefits of most development projects is extremely complex”);
Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 139 (cited in note 31) (“Determining the ‘efficiency’ . . .
of any project enabled by eminent domain is difficult at best, given the multiplicity
of a project’s possible costs and benefits, the length of the relevant time horizons, and
so on.”).
67
See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 197 (cited in note 4) (asserting that “nothing prevents municipalities and private interests from using inflated estimates of economic
benefits to justify condemnations”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 28 (cited in note 23)
(pointing out that private parties may “intentionally exaggerate the expected benefits of a taking for the purpose of obtaining the state’s condemnation authority”); see
64
65
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project, local officials could provide an estimate that purports to
demonstrate the potential for significant public benefits.68
Indeed, to rely on a test based on the magnitude of projected public
benefits (or even the anticipated ratio of public to private benefits)
makes little sense in light of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of
a “reasonable certainty” requirement in Kelo. The petitioners in Kelo
argued that, in examining economic development takings, the Court
should “require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public
benefits will actually accrue.”69 In rejecting this argument, the Court
noted that such a rule would represent a departure from precedent,
particularly the Court’s admonition in Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff 70 that federal courts are not the appropriate place for empirical debates about the wisdom of takings.71 In light of the Court’s
own skepticism regarding a reasonable certainty requirement, evaluating pretext by relying on a factor that requires a judicial determination of expected benefits seems problematic.72

also Gillette, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 20 (cited in note 24) (describing the government’s
“incentive for undue optimism” because “there is little reason for local officials not
to forecast the financially rosiest of futures for those parcels, since doing so gains
political support for the project, allowing them to take credit for what is described as
the impending economic boom”).
68
See Kelo, 545 US at 504 (O’Connor dissenting) (contending that neither the
Court’s rule nor Justice Kennedy’s “gloss” on that rule is a meaningful restraint on
private takings “[i]f legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits
of a new use can legitimate a taking”); cf. Supreme Court 2004 Term, Leading Cases,
Public Use—Economic Development, 119 Harv L Rev 287, 294 (2005) (asserting that
the majority’s test is “unlikely to have much bite: a reasonably creative legislator
will almost always be able to tell a story that connects a given taking with a projected
public benefit, particularly when a court will defer to her characterization of a purpose
as public”).
69
Kelo, 545 US at 487; see also Brief of Petitioners, Kelo v City of New London,
Civil Action No 04-108, *36 (US filed Dec 3, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL
2811059) (“The condemnation of property for economic development projects should
only occur if and when the government can show that there is reasonable certainty
that the project will proceed and yield the public benefits that are used to justify the
condemnation.”).
70
467 US 229 (1984).
71
See Kelo, 545 US at 488 (“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom
of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic
legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.” (quoting Midkiff, 467 US
at 242-43)); see also George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight
Got to Do With It?, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 803, 812 (2008) (“The Court will not hear
arguments that the plan’s means are unlikely to lead to the plan’s stated goals, or even
that the goals are unrealistic and unattainable.” (citing Kelo, 545 US at 488)).
72
Cf. Mahoney, 2005 Sup Ct Rev at 117-18 (cited in note 7) (“This last statement—
expressing confidence that courts will be able to readily identify takings that have no
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The ultimate problem with a test based on the magnitude of projected public benefits is thus one of administrability. It is extremely
difficult for a court to estimate the projected public benefits of a proposed taking. It is also extremely difficult for a court to estimate
the potential private benefits of a proposed taking. Relying on these
types of projections, therefore, fails to provide an effective safeguard
for ensuring that a local government’s asserted purpose is not pretextual.
2. Extensiveness of Planning and Process
Although not mentioning the public benefits factor, the majority
opinion in Kelo did emphasize the importance of “planning” in
evaluating whether a taking is pretextual. The Court directly juxtaposed pretext and planning. It concluded that, while New London
would not be allowed to take property under the “mere pretext” of a
public purpose, the takings at issue “would be executed pursuant to
a ‘carefully considered’ development plan.”73 The Court also noted
that, while not presented in this case, “a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development
plan, . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was
afoot . . . .”74 Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy
asserted that one of the reasons that a more demanding standard of
review was unnecessary was that the condemnations “occurred in
the context of a comprehensive development plan . . . .”75 In a recent
article examining Kelo’s emphasis on planning, Nicole Garnett
points out that the majority and concurring opinions mention the
words “plan” or “planning” nearly fifty times.76
The existence of a development plan has been relevant in several post-Kelo cases.77 Perhaps most notably, in Didden v. Village
conceivable public purpose other than to generate additional taxes—to some degree
undermines the earlier claim that there is no practicable way to distinguish economic
development takings from other exercises of the eminent domain power.”).
73
Kelo, 545 US at 478 (quoting Kelo v City of New London, 843 A2d 500, 536 (Conn.
2004) (emphasis added)).
74
Id at 487 (emphasis added).
75
Id at 493 (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added).
76
See Nicole Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 Ecology L Q 443, 444 (2007)
(“The Kelo majority mentioned the words ‘plan’ or ‘planning’ forty times; Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion brought the tally to nearly fifty.”).
77
Compare Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v Valsamaki, 916 A2d 324,
351-52 & n 26 (Md 2007) (invalidating quick-take condemnation because, inter alia,
city had “no plan for the development of the Property”) with W. Seafood Co. v United
States, 2006 US App LEXIS 25520, *13, 2006 WL 2920809, **4 (5th Cir 2006) (“The
proposed taking of Western Seafood’s property is the result of a carefully considered
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of Port Chester,78 storeowner Bart Didden and several landowners
(collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) sued Port Chester and several Private
Defendants, including the Village’s preferred developer, to prevent
the use of eminent domain for a redevelopment project.79 The Plaintiffs alleged that the “Private Defendants demanded that Plaintiffs
either pay them $800,000 or give them a partnership interest in the
project or Private Defendants would cause Port Chester to commence a condemnation proceeding” against their property.80 The
district court held that Plaintiffs’ primary claims were time-barred
but that, in any event, the “allegation of an extortionate demand of
$800,000 to avoid condemnation adds nothing of legal significance
to Plaintiffs’ claims.”81 On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded
that, even if Plaintiffs’ claims were not time-barred, Kelo precludes
these claims “to the extent that they assert that the Takings Clause
prevents the State from condemning their property for a private use
within a redevelopment district . . . .”82 The court appeared to be suggesting that, because these condemnations had occurred within a
“redevelopment district,” Kelo effectively insulates the takings from
a public use challenge.83
development plan.”). But cf. MiPro Homes, L.L.C. v Mount Laurel Twp, 878 A2d 38,
44 (NJ Super 2005) (concluding that a municipality may exercise authority to condemn
property for open space “even though it does not presently have a plan to devote the
property to active recreational uses”), aff’d 910 A2d 617 (NJ 2006) (per curiam).
78
304 F Supp 2d 548 (SDNY 2004), aff’d 2006 US App LEXIS 8653, 2006 WL 898093
(2d Cir 2006).
79
Id at 551.
80
Id at 556. The court initially denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and concluded that Plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their takings claim. See
id at 559. The court asserted that, because the redevelopment project “serves a clear
public purpose—the redevelopment of the blighted downtown area of Port Chester,”
the “alleged ‘bribe’ by Private Defendants, even if it was a ‘bad faith’ offer, could not
in any way have transformed that public purpose into a private purpose.” Id. The court
also noted that it could not “get involved in parsing the particular degree of public
or private motivation behind the inclusion of a particular site in the Project area, so
long as that inclusion could rationally be related to the public purpose of the plan as a
whole.” Id (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc v New York State Urban Development Corp, 605 F Supp 612 (SDNY), aff’d, 771 F2d 44, 45 (2d Cir 1985)).
81
Didden v Village of Port Chester, 322 F Supp 2d 385, 390 (SDNY 2004).
82
Didden, 2006 US App LEXIS 8653, *4-5, 2006 WL 898093, **2.
83
See Amicus Brief of Law Professors D. Benjamin Barros, et al, Didden v Village of
Port Chester, Civil Action No 06-652, *4 (US filed Dec 8, 2006) (available on Westlaw
at 2006 WL 3610985) (“Law Professors Amicus Brief”) (“If the Court allows clearly
pretextual condemnations to go forward merely because they occur within a redevelopment area, then the proliferation of these areas will open the door to widespread
abuses of political power.”); cf. Garnett, 34 Ecology L Q at 453-54 (cited in note 76)
(concluding that “the majority opinion in Kelo and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
suggest that planning almost always precludes a finding of pretext” and that “it is
fairly clear that Kelo proceeds on the assumption that planning and pretext are usually
incompatible”).
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In theory, an emphasis on planning might reduce the number of
pretextual takings. Planning might act as a filtering mechanism. By
requiring local officials and private developers to engage in a certain
level of planning, the public might obtain more information about
the assembly and thus be more likely to identify a taking as pretextual. Planning also might act as a deterrent mechanism. If local officials and private developers know that condemnations must occur
within development plans and that the public is able to scrutinize
these plans, they may hesitate before proposing projects that are not
in the public interest. Furthermore, even if planning does not help
to identify or deter pretextual takings, planning might increase the
costs of relying on eminent domain. These costs may cause local governments to rely on eminent domain less frequently in assembling
land on behalf of private developers.84
Ultimately, planning is unlikely to provide an adequate test for
identifying pretext. Planning’s primary effect is on the timing of the
condemnations rather than the type of condemnations. Extensive
planning increases the length of the process.85 However, while a longer
process may provide property owners more time to organize politically,86 it does not necessarily provide a mechanism for distinguishing
between legitimate and pretextual takings. Moreover, if planning did
disclose that a taking was pretextual, it is doubtful that the sanction
imposed on a private party, if any, would be significant. Planning is
thus unlikely to deter firms who are willing to threaten local officials with the possibility of relocating. Finally, although planning
does increase an assembly’s costs, higher costs may not diminish
a taking’s private benefits to such an extent that private developers would abandon their efforts to acquire eminent domain. Indeed,
because planning costs usually will be borne by the government, not
the developers themselves,87 a planning requirement may not deter
developers from seeking eminent domain for their own objectives.
See Amicus Brief of the American Planning Association, et al, Kelo v. City of New
London, Civil Action No 04-108, *26 (US filed Jan 21, 2005) (available on Westlaw at
2005 WL 166929) (“APA Amicus Brief”) (“To the extent the need to undertake a planning process including public participation magnifies the cost differential between
eminent domain and market transactions, these processes also provide a further disincentive to use eminent domain.”).
85
See Garnett, 34 Ecology L Q at 460 (cited in note 76) (“Planning takes time . . . .”).
86
See id. (pointing out that “the planning process may give property owners (and
especially homeowners) an opportunity to organize so as to protect their interests”).
87
See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 57 (cited in note 24) (pointing out that for publicprivate redevelopment projects “the city might contribute . . . the land either for free
or at below market value”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 37 (cited in note 23) (noting that
private parties who benefit from the use of eminent domain are “usually not required
to pay any compensation to either the condemnees or the state” and discussing several
examples where acquisition costs were nominal).
84
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In any event, while additional costs may decrease the government’s
reliance on eminent domain, they do not help to distinguish between
situations in which private involvement is necessary and situations
in which it may be pretextual.88
In addition to emphasizing planning, Justice Kennedy focused
on the related issue of the condemnor’s compliance with eminent
domain’s procedural requirements. Kennedy noted that New London
had “complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate
review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”89 While
enforcing procedural requirements does increase the costs of eminent domain and thereby encourages reliance on market exchange,90
procedure, like planning, does not provide a mechanism for distinguishing between takings in which private involvement is legitimate
and takings in which private involvement is pretextual. Indeed, pro88
The case law presents two doctrinal complications with relying on planning as
well. First, although the Supreme Court cited 99 Cents Only as being problematic
because of the absence of planning, the condemnation in 99 Cents Only actually did
occur pursuant to a development plan. See note 4 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores v Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F Supp 2d 1123, 1125 (CD Cal 2001)). The Court’s
citation to 99 Cents Only raises the question of whether all condemnations within
a plan are incompatible with a finding of pretext or only a subset of condemnations
within a plan; alternatively, the Court’s concern with the type of condemnation at
issue in 99 Cents Only may have been less about the existence of a development plan
and more about the fact that the taking was “a one-to-one transfer of property.” Id;
see also Part V(B)(6) (discussing one-to-one takings). Second, if a development plan is
indeed all that is required to immunize a taking from being evaluated for a pretextual
motivation, then planning could create a zone free from judicial review. Petitioners
in Didden pointed out this apparent anomaly in seeking to persuade the Supreme
Court to issue a writ of certiorari. See Petition for Certiorari, Didden v Village of Port
Chester, Civil Action No 06-652, *10 (US filed Nov 7, 2006) (available on Westlaw at
2006 WL 3265594) (“If the Second Circuit’s interpretation is allowed to stand, it will
effectively insulate condemnations in redevelopment areas from judicial review.”);
see also supra note 83.
89
Kelo, 545 US at 493. Here, Justice Kennedy seemed to be adopting an argument
from the American Planning Association’s amicus brief, which Thomas Merrill and
John Echeverria co-authored. See APA Amicus Brief, *24 (cited in note 84). In their brief,
Merrill and Echeverria point out that “[e]minent domain is generally more expensive
[than market purchase] because the power is cabined by a variety of procedural requirements that entail significant cost and delay for agencies seeking to acquire resources.”
Id. They thus suggest that “the most constructive contribution courts can make in
protecting against misuse or overuse of eminent domain is to insist that the procedural
requirements associated with the exercise of eminent domain be faithfully followed in
every case.” Id at 25; see also David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings
206 (Foundation Press, 2002) (“In effect, the imposition of the due process tax makes
the exercise of eminent domain largely self-regulating: It will be used only where the
surplus to the taker is greater than the due process tax.”).
90
See notes 12 & 84; see also APA Amicus Brief at *25 (cited in note 84) (“Strict
enforcement of procedural requirements . . . makes eminent domain largely selfregulating, in the sense that it will only be used in situations where the costs of negotiated exchange are prohibitive.”).
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cedural regularity is an imperfect proxy for the absence of pretext
because, even assuming that due process costs would be borne by
private developers (rather than local governments), developers may
be willing to bear significant due process costs to obtain windfall
benefits. Conversely, procedural irregularity is an imperfect proxy
for the presence of pretext because a deficiency in process does not
necessarily mean that the taking itself is pretextual.91
The ultimate problem with relying on planning or process is thus
one of futility. A local government that wishes to use the power of
eminent domain on behalf of a private developer can easily do so,
even if the taking is pretextual, simply by incorporating the taking
into a comprehensive development plan and following the requisite
procedural requirements.92 Moreover, if a court invalidates a taking
based on a lack of planning or a deficiency in procedure, local officials can accomplish the same objective simply by reauthorizing the
condemnation within a more comprehensive development plan or
using more stringent procedural requirements.93 Likewise, while
planning and procedural requirements do increase the costs of eminent domain, these requirements may be futile if a private developer
(or the local government on behalf of a developer) is still willing to
pay these costs to obtain the resulting private benefits.
3. Identification of Private Parties
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy both suggested that the condemnations at issue in Kelo were not pretextual for an additional reason:
the identities of the private beneficiaries were not known until after
the development plan was adopted. Stevens asserted that it is “difficult to accuse the government of having taken A’s property to benefit
the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.”94
91
Cf. Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 816 (1996) (noting that “it is a long leap
from the proposition that following regular procedures is some evidence of lack of
pretext to the proposition that failure to follow regular procedures proves (or is an
operational substitute for) pretext”).
92
See Kelo, 545 US at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (“Whatever the details of Justice
Kennedy’s as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid
staff[er]’ failing it.” (citing Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003,
1025-26 n 12 (1992) (alteration in Kelo))).
93
Cf. Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 236 (cited in note 4) (“Even if the jurisdiction in
question did not initially intend to adopt a plan, after Kelo, it would surely choose to
do so in order to insulate itself from legal challenge.”).
94
Kelo, 545 US at 478 n 6; see also id (explaining that “while the City intends
to transfer certain of the parcels to a private developer in a long-term lease—which
developer, in turn, is expected to lease the office space and so forth to other private
tenants—the identities of those private parties were not known when the plan was
adopted”).
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Likewise, Kennedy pointed out that the trial court had considered
testimony indicating that “the substantial commitment of public
funds by the State to the development project [had occurred] before
most of the private beneficiaries were known” and that “the other
private beneficiaries of the project are still unknown because the
office space proposed to be built has not yet been rented.”95 Kennedy
also maintained that a more demanding level of scrutiny was unnecessary because “[t]he identities of most of the private beneficiaries
[we]re unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.”96
However, a recent case from the Second Circuit, Goldstein v.
Pataki,97 suggests that lower courts may not believe that the timing
of the identification of private parties is decisive. Goldstein involved
the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project, a twenty-two
acre, multibillion dollar assembly in downtown Brooklyn.98 Plaintiffs, fifteen property owners, contended that Bruce Ratner, the project’s primary developer, and his development firm, Forest City Ratner
Companies, were the actual impetus behind the project.99 On appeal,
the Second Circuit noted that the “sequence of events was certainly
one of the factors considered in Kelo” and also observed that, “unlike
in Kelo, the Atlantic Yards Project was allegedly proposed in the
first instance by Ratner himself.”100 Yet the court, quoting a New
York state case, quickly dismissed this concern and asserted that
“New York long ago decided by statute not to restrict [a development
corporation’s] mandate to those ‘projects in which it is the prime

Id at 491-92 (Kennedy concurring).
Id at 493. The timing concerning the identification of private parties is actually
somewhat complicated in Kelo. Plaintiffs alleged that the project’s primary beneficiary
was not the developer who would lease the assembled land or other private parties
who might rent office space but rather Pfizer Corporation, which recently opened a
global research facility nearby. The Court asserted that the New London Development
Corporation (NLDC) intended for the development plan “to capitalize on the arrival
of the Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract.” Id at 474. The
dissenters viewed the relationship differently, noting that the city council approved
the NLDC’s development plan just two months after Pfizer had announced that it
would build its new facility. See id at 495 (O’Connor dissenting).
97
516 F3d 50 (2d Cir 2008).
98
Id at 53. Plans for the site include a new professional basketball stadium, sixteen
high-rise apartment towers, several office towers, and the creation of a public open
space. Id.
99
Id at 55-56. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged “that [Ratner], not a state agency, first
conceived of developing Atlantic Yards, that the Ratner Group proposed the geographic boundaries of the Project, and that it was [Ratner’s] plan for the Project that
the ESDC [Empire State Development Corporation] eventually adopted without significant modification.” Id.
100
Id at 64.
95
96
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mover.’ ”101 If Kelo’s discussion of pretext is based on federal constitutional law, it is unclear why a New York state decision, interpreting
New York law, would have any effect on the analysis.102 In any event,
the court did not seem bothered by the sequence of events and ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of pretext.103
The intuition behind relying on the timing of the identification of
private parties is relatively straightforward. If a private party’s identity is unknown at the time of a development plan’s adoption, it is
unlikely that the private party is the impetus behind the project. On
the other hand, if a private party’s identity is known at the time of a
development plan’s adoption, it is possible that the private party is
the impetus behind the project. The Court’s emphasis on the identification of private parties is thus a plausible criterion by which to judge
whether a taking’s asserted purpose is a pretextual one. Moreover,
if lower courts actually were to apply this factor, it may be more
difficult for private developers to demand that local governments
condemn particular sites as public-private coordination would be
possible only after the adoption of a development plan.
The problem with this factor, however, is that it is potentially
both underinclusive and overinclusive. It is sometimes unnecessary,
even after the development plan is known, to rely on a particular
preferred developer. Under these circumstances, if the government
selects a preferred developer, it creates the possibility of impermissible favoritism. This factor is thus potentially underinclusive. On
the other hand, it may sometimes be necessary, even before the adoption of the development plan, to rely on a particular private developer.104 Indeed, in certain situations, a private developer may have
information that local officials do not have regarding the appropriate

101
Id (quoting E Thirteenth St Cmty Ass’n v NY State Hous Fin Agency, 218 AD2d
512, 513 (NY App Div 1st Dep’t 1995)).
102
But cf. Franco, 930 A2d at 175 (asserting that “nothing in Kelo suggests that the
items of evidence mentioned there set constitutional standards”).
103
See Goldstein, 516 F3d at 65. By contrast, in Franco, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals explicitly credited plaintiff’s allegation that the revitalization corporation entered into a joint development agreement with a private developer two years
before the introduction of the first bill concerning the assembly. 930 A2d at 170-71.
104
Cf. Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 811 (cited in note 71) (pointing out, as a
descriptive matter, that “most redevelopment authorities work closely with consultants and private developers to identify private market users before acquiring land for
redevelopment”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 57-58 (cited in note 24) (asserting, as a
normative matter, that Justice Kennedy’s focus on “the timing of the identification of
the private beneficiaries” is problematic because “it may be of financial and strategic
advantage to the public to have a master developer involved in the economic and
physical planning of the site well before site acquisition is complete”).
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site for an assembly project. As a result, this factor is potentially
overinclusive as well.
Ultimately, the problem with relying exclusively on the timing
of the identification of private parties is one of disutility. This factor may permit certain takings involving post-condemnation private
involvement by particular developers even where such involvement
is unnecessary. Conversely, this factor may prohibit certain takings
involving pre-condemnation private involvement even where such
involvement may be necessary.
B. An Alternative Test Based on Intent
If the current framework is problematic, it is appropriate to consider
alternative tests. One obvious possibility is to focus exclusively on
the condemnor’s intent. In an ideal world in which motivation is perfectly observable, the test would be simple. If the condemnor asserts
a public purpose for a taking and the condemnor’s asserted purpose
for the taking is the actual purpose, then the condemnation is not
pretextual. If the condemnor’s asserted purpose for the taking is not
the actual purpose, and the actual purpose is to bestow a benefit on a
private party, then the condemnation is pretextual.105
However, a test based exclusively on a condemnor’s motivation
is problematic for several reasons. As an initial matter, a condemnation that is invalidated merely on the basis of the condemnor’s
intent may result in a social loss if the project is, in fact, welfareenhancing.106 Moreover, because a condemnor usually does not disclose what is motivating a particular decision, a test based on intent
may be futile.107 Finally, because the condemnor’s actual motivation
is relatively difficult to determine, the test may not be judicially
administrable.108
105
See, for example, Middletown Twp v Lands of Stone, 939 A2d 331, 337 (Pa 2007)
(“In considering whether a primary public purpose was properly invoked, this Court
has looked for the ‘real or fundamental purpose’ behind a taking. Stated otherwise, the
true purpose must primarily benefit the public.” (citation omitted)); see also Oswald,
35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61 (cited in note 44) (“Some courts have . . . tried to address
the issue by examining whether the purpose articulated by the condemnor is a real
one, or is just a sham. This leads the court into convoluted issues of true versus stated
purpose and raises the ill-defined role of bad faith in takings analysis.”). Below, I consider another possibility: that the asserted purpose for the taking is not the actual
purpose for the taking but the actual purpose is not to bestow a benefit on a private
party. See Part V(B)(7). While such a scenario is likely to arise rather infrequently, it is
a possibility if the condemnor’s objective is to target a disfavored party rather than to
benefit a favored party. See id.
106
See Part II(B) (describing problem of “disutility”).
107
See id (describing problem of “futility”).
108
See id (describing problem of “administrability”).
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In practice, courts have been quite reluctant to investigate the
underlying motivations of state legislators and local officials who
authorize and exercise the eminent domain power.109 As the Second
Circuit recently emphasized: “We do not read Kelo’s reference to
‘pretext’ as demanding . . . a full judicial inquiry into the subjective
motivation of every official who supported the Project, an exercise
as fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties as with statesovereignty and separation-of-power concerns.”110 The D.C. Court
of Appeals has pointed out as well that, in evaluating whether a taking is pretextual, there are “formidable barriers to discovering the
motives and intentions of individual legislators.”111 The benefits of
discovery, for instance, may be minimal because normally “legislators may not be deposed or made to answer interrogatories in an
attempt to disclose their individual motivations.”112
Yet, at least as a descriptive matter, the difficulty of determining
motivation by itself does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting an intent-based test. The Supreme Court has approved similar
inquiries in a number of contexts. For example, in Batson v. Kentucky,113 the Court explicitly rejected the government’s argument
that judicial inquiries into the purpose of prosecutors’ preemptory
challenges would present serious administrative difficulties.114 Similarly, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,115 the Court
considered the motivation of city council members and emphasized
that “we may determine the city council’s object from both direct
and circumstantial evidence” including “the historical background
of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading
to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative
or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements
made by members of the decisionmaking body.”116 Even in Whren v.
United States,117 where the Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved, Justice Scalia, writing for
109
See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 59 (cited in note 44) (concluding that
“courts generally view inquiries into the motives behind eminent domain actions as
off-limits”).
110
Goldstein, 516 F3d at 63.
111
Franco, 930 A2d at 173.
112
Id at 173 n 12 (citations omitted); cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at
116 (cited in note 23) (pointing out that “courts have been quite reluctant to put too
much stock in what local legislators say on the record, much less to take testimony
about what the legislators might have been thinking when they cast their votes”).
113
476 US 79 (1986).
114
Id at 99.
115
508 US 520 (1993).
116
Id at 540.
117
517 US 806 (1996).
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a unanimous Court, noted that the Court’s prior cases in this area
were not based only, or even principally, on the difficulty of establishing subjective intent.118 In the takings context itself, courts have
developed a number of tests including “bad faith” for analyzing a
condemnor’s intent.119
Perhaps an even more significant concern with a test based exclusively on intent is that a condemnor may have “mixed” motives.120
The possibility of mixed motives is particularly likely when a firm
threatens to relocate unless the local government utilizes eminent
domain on its behalf. The problem arises because, before the relocation threat, local officials may not wish to condemn the land. Indeed,
officials may view such a condemnation as a transfer that merely
serves a private interest. However, after the relocation threat, officials
may conclude that preventing the firm from relocating is essential
and thus may decide to condemn the land for the firm. Paradoxically,
therefore, officials may act in a way that is genuinely motivated by
the public interest even though the purpose of the taking is solely for
a private benefit. But because these threats to relocate may decrease
social welfare, takings such as the condemnations at issue in Poletown or 99 Cents Only should not be immune from judicial scrutiny
even though, at the time of the takings, the condemnors may have
been genuinely motivated by a public purpose.121
Hence, a test for pretext based exclusively on the condemnor’s
intent arguably entails the problems of disutility, futility, and administrability. A test based solely on intent also would permit the use of
Id at 814.
See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61-62 (cited in note 44) (asserting that,
“although the courts in theory eschew the notion that they can inquire into the
motives underlying a taking, they in practice, by acknowledging a role for evaluating
the condemnor’s actions for subterfuge or bad faith, open the door to at least limited
inquiries about motive” (citing City of Evansville v Reising, 547 NE2d 1106, 1111 (Ind
Ct App 1989))).
120
Cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 115 (cited in note 23) (noting that
legislation “often is motivated by a complex myriad of purposes” and discussing three
possible tests for “mixed motive” cases).
121
See William J. Stern, State Capitalism, New York Style, City J, 70-75 (Summer
1994) (concluding that “the practice of ad hoc deal-making to induce particular companies to stay is misguided” because “it creates an incentive for businesses to threaten
to leave, even if they have no intention of doing so”), quoted in Ellickson & Been, Land
Use Controls at 885 (cited in note 23); cf. Ralph Nader and Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 Vill L Rev 207, 219 n 87 (2004) (asserting that “the notion
that th[e] exercise of eminent domain [in Poletown] was valuable to Detroit’s economy
is problematic” because “it was brought about by GM’s threat to relocate, which may
have been a bluff” (citation omitted)). But cf. Steve Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and
Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 S Ct Econ Rev 63, 104 (2009) (arguing that any test
for pretext based on public benefits is likely to be futile because even in a case like 99
Cents Only local officials genuinely did not want Costco to relocate).
118
119
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eminent domain even in situations—like the cases involving threats
to relocate—that clearly entail impermissible favoritism. Consequently, both the test proposed in Kelo and an intent-based test are
unsatisfactory. What is needed is a framework that is able to target
pretext more precisely.
I V. W H E N P R I V A T E I N V O L V E M E N T B E C O M E S
PRETEXTUAL
A. Two Stages of an Assembly
To establish a framework for identifying pretext, I first examine
the possible reasons for private involvement in the condemnation
process. The primary justification for such involvement is that the
public might benefit if private parties are able to assist the local government in executing a development project. Because private ownership or control might increase the likelihood of a successful project,
private parties may have a role in developing an assembly site. But
private parties may have another role as well. Specifically, private
parties may have information that the local government does not
have regarding the optimal location for an assembly. Thus, private
parties also may be useful in identifying the assembly site.
1. Identifying the Site
The first stage of an assembly is identifying the relevant site. If the
local government is seeking to assemble land for one of its own projects, government officials usually will have a belief about whether
an assembly is necessary and, if so, where the assembly should take
place. Suppose a town is considering building a new public school.
Local officials might have information regarding the school’s optimal
location. These officials also might have information regarding the
costs of acquiring various parcels of land. If the best location for the
school contained a number of homes and business, the government
might have to pay a considerable sum either to purchase the land
or to condemn the land and pay just compensation. Local officials
might weigh the costs and benefits of this location against the costs
and benefits of purchasing undeveloped land in a suitable yet suboptimal location.122
See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 110-21 (cited in note 31) (pointing out that
“Takers” have an incentive to avoid properties with high subjective values); see also
Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 11 (cited in note 24) (“Agencies avoid acquisition of occupied residential land, whether by negotiation or condemnation, because of the expense
of relocation, and, in many situations, because of the risk of political controversy.”).
122
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By contrast, when a private party seeks to assemble land for a
private project, the local government may not know whether the
assembly is desirable or, if it is desirable, where the assembly should
take place. Suppose that a corporation wants to assemble land for
a new factory. Local officials may not know whether an assembly
is necessary to build the factory.123 Moreover, even if these officials
believe the assembly is necessary, the officials may not know the
optimal location for the assembly. The corporation may have particular specifications regarding the parcel’s size and shape, its proximity
to roads and other instrumentalities of commerce, and its location in
relation to the potential labor force.
A private party could share this information with the government.
For example, in Poletown, General Motors had a number of specifications that it announced were necessary for its new facility. GM
“told the city that it must find or assemble a parcel 450 to 500 acres
in size with access to long-haul railroad lines and a freeway system
with railroad marshalling yards within the plant site.”124 However,
whenever a private party such as GM shares information with local
officials, the officials are relying on the private party’s own representations and estimates. The actual value of these specifications
is usually a fact that is known only by the company, not the government. In relying on this information, local officials take a risk
regarding the desirability of the project unless the representations
and estimates are capable of being independently verified.
To be sure, certain assemblies may have to occur in particular locations because of the nature of the project. For example, in United
States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company,125 the federal government sought to acquire land at the Gettysburg battlefield. In that
case, the location of the battlefield itself determined the site of the
assembly.126 Similarly, in a town containing only one hill for a telephone tower, the local government might know that the hill is the
optimal site for a company attempting to provide mobile telephone

123
See Heller and Hills, 121 Harv L Rev at 1480 (cited in note 35) (pointing out “the
additional difficulty of whether eminent domain sends to government and private
condemnees an accurate signal of the relative value of preserving the status quo or
assembling fragmented ownership patterns”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 25 (cited in
note 23) (noting that the government “may believe (albeit mistakenly) that the private
assembler values the land more than the existing owners” and, consequently, “may
use eminent domain to force a transfer even though the existing owners value the land
more than the assembler”).
124
Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 NW2d 455, 467 (Mich
1981) (Ryan dissenting).
125
160 US 668 (1896).
126
See id at 670.
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and radio paging services.127 However, even this type of determination may require “extensive study and testing” to determine the
optimal location.128 Of course, many other assembly projects do not
require a unique site.129
The importance of this stage, identifying the optimal assembly
site, is thus generally underappreciated. Disputes over eminent domain typically attract widespread attention only after a case is litigated. The view of courts, as well as the public, is thus likely to
be from an ex post perspective. Indeed, while courts often focus on
whether the post-condemnation use of a parcel is a “public purpose,”
they often do not consider the possible legal significance of the precondemnation process of identifying the site.
2. Developing the Site
The government also may rely on private parties to develop an assembly site. As noted above, the traditional justification for private
involvement is that private developers are likely to be more effective than the government at executing certain projects. Writing for
a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Douglas emphasized in Berman v. Parker that “[t]he public end may be as well or better served
through an agency of private enterprise than through a department
of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public
purposes of community redevelopment projects.”130 Over fifty years
later, the Kelo Court reiterated this justification for private involvement.131
Private development of a site can take a number of forms. Private
involvement may be limited to assisting local officials with the
construction or implementation of a public project. For example, a
county that is building a new courthouse might hire a private architect, a private engineering firm, and a private construction company
to complete the project. This type of project, although relying on
private parties, entails the same type of public-private coordination
that occurs for any government contract in which a private party may
See, for example, Williams v Hyrum Gibbons & Sons, 602 P2d 684 (Utah 1979).
Id at 685.
129
Cf. Heller and Hills, 121 Harv L Rev at 1492-94 (cited in note 35) (differentiating
between target fragmentation and target uniqueness).
130
348 US 26, 33-34 (1954).
131
Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 486 (2005) (quoting Berman, 348 US at
33-34); cf. Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note 24) (“Cities recognize . . . that
while they can facilitate or oversee much of the redevelopment, they are not equipped
to take on many aspects of the effort.”).
127

128
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receive an indirect benefit.132 Typically, to the extent such involvement raises concerns about favoritism, these concerns can be mitigated by competitive bidding and other mechanisms that reduce the
likelihood of corruption and private influence.133
However, instead of continuing to own the property itself, a local
government may decide to transfer the land in fee simple to a private
party. For example, the government might condemn several blighted
parcels, assemble the properties, and transfer the land to a private
developer to build condominiums or office buildings. Often this
transfer is made for a nominal sum.134 Private involvement of this
sort gives a developer complete control over the site. If the developer
initially proposed a particular project to local officials, the developer
may continue with that project after the transfer. But the developer also might decide to terminate the project and use the land for a
different purpose or even to sell the land for a profit.135 Generally, this
type of private involvement raises concerns about pretext because
local officials retain no control over the site and private parties may
obtain a significant benefit.
When a local government wants a private party to use or develop a
site, but still wants to retain ownership of the land, the government
may decide to lease the land to a private party.136 Such leases are
132
See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 59 (cited in note 24) (“In some cases, a contract
formalizes this agency relationship such that the developer simply performs its obligations for a negotiated fee.”).
133
See generally Lani A. Perlman, Note, Guarding the Government’s Coffers: The
Need For Competition Requirements to Safeguard Federal Government’s Procurement, 75 Fordham L Rev 3187, 3187 (2007) (“The rules controlling the federal government’s allocation of $350 billion in contracts emphasize competition as a safeguard
against collusion between government buyers and private sellers.”).
134
See, for example, Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban
Development in the 21st Century, 22 Ga St U L Rev 895, 901 (2006) (“As part of the
effort to prevent General Motors from building elsewhere, the city [of Detroit] spent
over $200 million to acquire and prepare the property, which it sold to the company
for $8 million.”).
135
See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
Geo Wash L Rev 936, 980 (2003) (“Obviously, if a private party received an unencumbered fee simple title to condemned land, it is free to change the use of the land at any
time.”); see also Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 53 n 247 (cited in note 23) (pointing out
that “a private party may not use the condemned land in a manner consistent with
the original public purpose”).
136
See Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 981 (cited in note 135) (“[T]he government
might retain title to the land but enter into a long term lease providing that the private
party use the land for the intended public purpose.”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 39
n 180 (cited in note 24) (“Ground leases are effective tools in redevelopment because
they reduce or eliminate developers’ up front land costs and enable redevelopment
agencies to maintain control over a project after completion.” (citing David F. Beatty
et al Redevelopment in California 153 (Solano Press Books, 2d ed. 1995))). It is also pos-
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frequently long-term leases (often, for ninety-nine years), and lease
payments may be nominal as well.137 Some public-private leases contain provisions that restrict the private party’s use of the land.138 If the
private party deviates from the lease’s terms, the deviation may constitute a material breach of the agreement.139 Some states also have
enacted “clawback” statutes. If a public purpose is not being realized,
these statutes allow government officials to reacquire control of a
property.140 As with private ownership, however, a long-term lease
raises concerns about pretext because, while the government retains
an ownership interest, the private lessee usually exercises significant
control over the site and may obtain a substantial benefit.
The government’s reliance on private enterprise is premised on
the view that the private sector is more efficient in executing certain projects.141 Yet private involvement in developing the site means
that a private party is able to obtain a distinct benefit. Indeed, being
selected as a private developer entails the possibility of windfall profits, especially if the developer buys or leases the land for a nominal

sible that the government could condemn only a leasehold interest and then transfer
that interest to a private party. Cf. Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through
Eminent Domain: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 Cath U L
Rev 503, 505 (2007) (suggesting that it may be “time for governmental entities to seriously consider using eminent domain to acquire less than a fee simple interest in real
property when the specific need is important, of a limited—rather than an indefinite—
duration, and a bargained-for exchange cannot be negotiated”).
137
See, for example, Kelo, 545 US at 476 n 4 (noting that the development corporation “was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison” and that “[t]he
negotiations contemplated a nominal rent of $1 per year”).
138
See, for example, id at 486 n 15 (“Notably, as in the instant case, the private
developers in Berman were required by contract to use the property to carry out the
redevelopment plan.” (citing Berman, 348 US at 30)). For a description of other ways in
which the government might be able to ensure that a private party carries out a public
purpose, see Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 980-81 (cited in note 135).
139
See Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 981 (cited in note 135) (“Under these circumstances, the abandonment of the public purpose would be considered a material breach
and grounds for termination of the lease.”).
140
See id at 978 (“A number of states have considered or adopted ‘clawback’ legislation penalizing the recipient of development incentives for failing to follow through
on promised investment or job creation.”).
141
See Donald E. Sanders and Patricia Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 Real
Estate LJ 157, 167 (2005) (“If it is true that generally the free market delivers goods and
services more efficiently than the government, then it is more efficient for the government to condemn the property and then transfer it to a private party for the economic
development.”); see also Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 40 (cited in note 24) (concluding
that “government has come to appreciate that developers have capabilities that government does not share” and listing a number of these capabilities including “certain
project or building-specific planning expertise, development, construction, leasing
and sometimes maintenance expertise”).
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sum.142 A private party thus has an incentive to lobby the government, to outmaneuver other private parties, and to threaten relocation in order to obtain the power of eminent domain.143
B. Four Categories of Takings
Because an assembly project consists of two stages, the identification stage and the development stage, private involvement is possible before the taking has occurred, after the taking has occurred,
or both before and after the taking has occurred. Obviously, it is also
possible for the government to exercise eminent domain without
private involvement. The result is four types of takings (represented
below in Figure 1) that involve varying degrees of public and private
involvement.
The columns in Figure 1 indicate the source that provides the
information by which a particular assembly site is identified. Thus,
Column 1 (“Public Information”) means that the government itself
has information regarding the optimal site. Column 2 (“Private
Information”) means that the government has to rely on one or more
private parties to provide information regarding the site. The rows in
Figure 1 indicate the identity of the developer. Thus, Row 1 (“Public
Development”) means that the government itself continues to own
the land and ultimately executes the project. Row 2 (“Private Development”) means that the government sells or leases the land to one
or more private parties and these parties ultimately control the property and execute the project.
Of course, the line between “public development” and “private
development” is not always clear.144 For example, a local government
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 37-39 (cited in note 23) (describing problem of
costless acquisition).
143
See id at 39 (noting that private developers “will have a powerful incentive to use
almost any means—including intensive lobbying, political contributions, expensive
lawyers, threats to relocate, and sometimes even bribery—to obtain the takings power
for their own private objectives”).
144
Cf. Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 39 (cited in note 24) (noting that “[m]odern development mixes government and private ownership in arrangements that defeat any
bright-line test”). Here, I use the term “development” rather than “ownership” to
emphasize that the relevant inquiry is not whether a public or private entity formally
owns the land but whether a public or private entity is the primary gatekeeper and
beneficiary of the property. Cf. id at 41 (arguing that “it is much too simple to talk
about ‘ownership’ because the proverbial bundle of sticks associated with land ownership has been deliberately broken apart and replaced with a pattern of contractual
responsibilities that allocates to the respective public and private parties the specific
elements of assembly, clearance, construction, maintenance, and control they are best
equipped to perform for the subject development”).
142
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Figure 1.

Four Categories of Takings

may use eminent domain for a revitalization project that includes
both condominiums and office towers (quintessential private developments) and streets and parks (quintessential public developments).145
However, the line here is a functional, rather than formal, one, and
most developments can be categorized as either public or private. For
example, the project in Kelo included a “public walkway” and “state
park,”146 yet most observers, including the justices in the majority,
characterized the project as a private development.147 As a general
matter, it seems plausible to assume that courts are usually capable
of distinguishing between public and private developments.148
The two ways of acquiring information (public and private) and
the two types of developers (public and private) yield four possibilities. First, an assembly may be based on public information and rely
on public development (Category 1). Second, an assembly may be
based on private information and rely on public development (Category 2). Third, an assembly may be based on public information and
utilize a private developer (Category 3). Fourth, an assembly may be
based on private information and utilize a private developer (Category 4). I examine each of these possibilities in turn.149
See id at 38 (“Public uses are intermingled with private uses in the same development, in the same building, and even the same space within a building.” (citing Todd W.
Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in Peter Katz, The New Urbanism: Toward an
Architecture of Community, xxx-xxxv (McGraw-Hill 1994))).
146
545 US at 474.
147
See id at 478 n 6 (acknowledging that “the City intends to transfer certain of
the parcels to a private developer in a long-term lease—which developer, in turn, is
expected to lease the office space and so forth to other private tenants”).
148
But cf. In re Seattle, 638 P2d 549, 556 (Wash 1981) (en banc) (“If a private use is
combined with a public use in such a way that the two cannot be separated, the right
of eminent domain cannot be invoked.”).
149
For a different categorization, see Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You Solve a
Problem Like In Kelo?, 40 J Marshall L Rev 609, 612 (2007) (analyzing three categories
of takings—(i) a “ ‘traditional taking’ where the government will own the land taken,”
(ii) a “non-traditional taking where a private party will own the land taken,” and (iii)
a traditional taking or non-traditional taking “where the land taken is the property
owner’s home”—and proposing an increasing level of scrutiny for each category).
145
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1. Public Information—Public Development
If an assembly project is based on public information and executed
by a public development, the risk that the taking is pretextual is
minimal. The reason is that there is no private involvement in either
identifying or developing the assembly site. Private involvement is
unnecessary for identifying the site because the determination of the
optimal site is based on the government’s own information. Private
involvement is also unnecessary for developing the site because the
government, rather than a private party, is capable of executing the
development.
Consequently, there is usually little concern about impermissible
favoritism in traditional government takings. When a local government takes land for a public park, the government decides where
the park will be located. After the assembly is complete, the government continues to own and operate the park. Individuals who enjoy
exercising outdoors may frequent the park more than others. Residents who own parcels near the park may have their property values
increase while others may not. But the park itself is open to all, and
there is no single private party that receives a concentrated benefit.
For this category of takings, the risk of pretext is appropriately
characterized as “minimal” (rather than zero) because it is possible
that a public development based on public information could still be
pretextual. Specifically, even if no private party is involved in identifying the site and the government continues to own and control the
land, the government might use eminent domain to benefit a particular private party.150 For example, the government might condemn land
in order to build a railroad line whose only destination is a private
company at the end of the track. With regard to this type of project,
the private beneficiary is usually readily apparent. Perhaps as a result,
there is already a fairly well-developed jurisprudence for determining
whether such a project is for a public or private purpose.151 Of course,
simply because a project benefits one or more private parties does not
imply that the taking itself is based on impermissible favoritism.152
Id at 635 (noting that “even a literal public use—where the public has the right
to use of the property taken—could serve as a pretext for a taking really designed to
benefit a private party”).
151
See, for example, Union Lime Co. v Chicago & Nw Ry Co., 233 US 211, 222
(1914) (“There is a clear distinction between spurs which are owned and operated by
a common carrier as a part of its system and under its public obligation and merely
private sidings.” (collecting cases)).
152
Indeed, many governmental actions involve both winners and losers in the
private sector, but these actions do not involve the same type of impermissible favoritism as takings that directly benefit a particular party. See generally Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L J 547 (2001).
150
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Thus, “Category 1” takings, in which a public development is based
on public information, involve some risk of pretext but that risk is
minimal.
2. Private Information—Public Development
Similarly, if an assembly project is based on private information and
executed by a public development, the risk of pretext is minimal.
Although this category of takings does entail private involvement in
the initial stage of identifying the assembly site, there is no private
involvement in the subsequent stage of developing the site. The government ultimately retains ownership and control of the property.
For “Category 2” takings, there is thus little risk that the assembly
is pretextual.
In practice, this category of takings is relatively uncommon. Developers have virtually no incentive to share information with local
officials if they do not expect to receive a benefit from the resulting
assembly. If developers sometimes do have better information than
officials about the location of public projects, it might be desirable
to design a mechanism that encourages these developers to disclose
this information.
One possible mechanism by which a local government might obtain information regarding potential assembly sites is by compensating developers through rewards or contracts. The federal government relies on similar mechanisms in other situations in which
useful information is dispersed among private individuals. For example, Congress offers rewards for information regarding violations
of, among other laws, the Endangered Species Act153 and the Lacey
Act.154 Likewise, the Department of Interior relies on contracts with
private oil companies for exploratory drilling in public oil fields.155
In the takings context, however, the administrative costs of implementing a reward system or the transaction costs of entering exploratory contracts might be relatively high. These costs would include
the costs of calculating the expected social value of the private sector’s information regarding public projects. Ultimately, such costs
might outweigh the opportunity costs of the local government’s
not being able to rely on this type of information for its projects.
Nevertheless, in certain situations, if the government wants to rely
See 16 USC § 1540(d).
See 16 USC § 3375(d).
155
See, for example, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc v United States,
530 US 604, 610 (2000) (discussing steps necessary for private corporation to obtain
“an exploratory well drilling permit”).
153
154
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on private parties for information but is concerned about the possibility of pretext, a scheme that severs private involvement in the
identification stage from private involvement in the development
stage could be useful.
Overall, whenever the local government itself develops a condemned parcel, regardless of whether the government relies on public
or private information, pretext is generally not a concern. As discussed below, the risk that a taking’s asserted purpose is pretextual
increases significantly when a project involves a private developer.
3. Public Information—Private Development
If an assembly project is based on public information but executed
by a private developer, there is an elevated risk that the taking is
pretextual. In this situation, private involvement is unnecessary for
identifying the optimal assembly site because the determination
of the optimal site is based on the government’s own information.
However, private involvement may be necessary for developing the
site because a private party, rather than the government, is better
able to execute the development.
Knowing that a project will require private involvement, private
parties may attempt to persuade the government to designate them
as the developer before a site has been identified. As George Lefcoe
points out, this type of pre-condemnation private involvement is
routine:
Politically connected developers confer informally with public
officials about the possibility of their striking a redevelopment
deal long before the formal redevelopment process begins. An
experienced Florida-based land use attorney, Charles Siemon,
observes that developers and local officials often reach tentative agreements before the beginning of the public review process. The negotiated deal is presented and approved at a public
meeting pretty much as presented. State open meeting laws
require elected officials to conduct their business in sessions
that are open to the public but these laws don’t bar discussions
between developers and individual officials and most of them
allow officials to conduct secret discussions of real estate transactions.156
156
George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School
Districts, 83 Tul L Rev 45, 80-81 (2008) (citing Patience A. Crowder, “Ain’t No Sunshine”: Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public
Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 Tenn L Rev 623 (2007) and
Charles L. Siemon, Public/Private Partnerships and Fundamental Fairness in City
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This type of pre-condemnation private involvement increases the
possibility of corruption, secondary rent seeking, and relocation
threats—each of which can lead to socially undesirable outcomes.157
Moreover, even when developers are not selected before the site has
been identified, these problems may still exist because, after the government selects the site, developers may compete for the designation
of “preferred developer.”158 Thus, unlimited private involvement,
either before or after the taking, increases the risk of a pretextual
taking.
However, in situations in which the government does not need
to rely on private information to identify the assembly site, precondemnation private involvement is generally unnecessary. As
discussed above, the justification for private involvement before
the taking is that a private party may have better information than
the government regarding the optimal site.159 But here, because the
government itself has information regarding the site, such private
involvement is unnecessary. Moreover, although the government
may wish to rely on a private party to execute the development, it
is unnecessary for the government to select a preferred developer.160
Instead, the government can select a developer after the condemnations through a competitive process such as an auction.
Indeed, several commentators have pointed out the potential advantages of relying on mechanisms like auctions to reduce the risk
of favoritism in assembly projects. For example, Perry Shapiro and
Jonathan Pincus observe that “redevelopment partnerships may be
legitimate ways to reduce transaction costs and share development
risks, but they smack of cozy dealing between city hall and special
private interests.”161 Shapiro and Pincus thus propose an “open auction process” and point out that one of the attractive aspects of such
Deal Making, in Terry Jill Lassar, Introduction to City Deal Making 81 (Urban Land
Institute 1990)). For a contrasting view, see Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 55 (cited in note
24) (“Most developer-selection processes reveal that, while the resulting relationship
is important to both parties, it is not collusive.”).
157
See Part II(A).
158
See id.
159
See Part IV(A)(1).
160
The term “preferred developer” also encompasses a “master developer” that
the local government may select. See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note
24) (noting that “the city may advertise for a ‘master developer’ ” who may “assist
the city with planning, perform due diligence reviews concerning site issues such as
contamination, and assist in estimating the cost of old infrastructure demolition and
new project-related infrastructure and improvements”).
161
Perry Shapiro and Jonathan Pincus, Efficiency and Equity in the Assemblage of
Land for Public Use: The L2H2 Auction *4 (2007), online at http://www.economics
.adelaide.edu.au/workshops/workshops/2008papers/080407pincus.pdf (visited May
19, 2008).
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a process is that it “erases the suspicion of backroom cozy dealing
between politicians and private interests.”162
Justice Kennedy himself might be sympathetic to such an approach.
In his concurring opinion in Kelo, Kennedy emphasized that benefiting Pfizer did not appear to be the primary motivation of the project
because the government had “reviewed a variety of development
plans and chose a private developer from a group of applicants rather
than picking out a particular transferee beforehand.”163 An auction
process encourages “a group of applicants” as well. But an auction
has the additional benefit of removing governmental discretion in
selecting among the applicants.
This approach addresses all three of the problems created by
unlimited private involvement. First, limiting pre-condemnation
private involvement and post-condemnation involvement by a preferred private party reduces the possibility of corruption. Backroom
deals between local officials and private parties, as well as the perception of inordinate private influence in the eminent domain process,
are eliminated. Second, private parties have little incentive, either
before or after the condemnation, to lobby local officials to become
the preferred developer. Selecting a developer through a competitive
process thus reduces secondary rent seeking. Third, private parties
do not have any incentive to threaten to relocate. A party threatening
relocation unless the local government condemns land on its behalf
would have no way to ensure that it would be the new owner of the
assembled property.
This approach also does not create the problems inherent in the
existing test based on Kelo or an alternative test based on intent.
Prohibiting pre-condemnation private involvement in situations in
which the local government has information regarding the assembly
site does not eliminate a public benefit. Because this approach only
prohibits private involvement where such involvement does not
entail a public benefit, disutility is not a problem. Moreover, if a
court invalidated a taking based on impermissible favoritism, local
officials still would be required to limit private involvement in any
future attempt to condemn the land. Because it would be difficult for
the government to circumvent this rule, futility is also not a problem. Finally, the local government does have information regarding
certain types of takings including takings in which the reason for the
Id at *15; cf. Petition for Certiorari, Goldstein v Pataki, Civil Action No 07-1247,
*6 (US filed Mar 31, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 899311) (pointing out that
“the selection of private developers for projects that receive billions of dollars in tax
breaks and direct subsidies are typically subject to competitive selection”).
163
545 US at 492 (Kennedy concurring).
162
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assembly is observable or the site is known.164 Because these types
of takings can be identified in advance, administrability is also not
a problem.
Admittedly, an approach that prohibits all pre-condemnation private involvement, as well as all post-condemnation involvement by
a particular private developer, may be overinclusive. That is, even
when a local government has information regarding the optimal assembly site, there may be certain circumstances in which private
involvement is necessary, despite the risk of impermissible favoritism. For example, if a city lacks access to funding for the early
stages of a project, the city may need to rely on a private developer
to provide the necessary capital.165 The possibility of overinclusiveness suggests that, instead of a per se rule against pre-condemnation
private involvement or post-condemnation private involvement by
164
See, for example, Part V(B)(1) (discussing the observable characteristics of blight);
Part V(B)(2) (discussing redevelopment districts that already exist).
165
See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note 24) (“Cities typically lack access
to capital early in the project, [sic] cannot front high ‘predevelopment’ expenses (that is
the costs of planners, economists, engineers, and attorneys necessary to work through
the details of the project proposal).”). Commentators also have suggested that early
involvement by private parties may be useful for identifying the developer and the
ultimate owners and thereby for ensuring that there is sufficient interest in the project.
See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 841 (cited in note 71) (observing that “entrepreneurial redevelopment directors began reaching out to private developers early in the
planning stages” because “local governments came to appreciate the virtues of redevelopment agencies striking a deal with a developer or receiving sufficient expressions
of interest and preliminary negotiations to attain confidence that the project would
be completed on schedule”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 58 (cited in note 24) (asserting
that “very early in the project, even during the extensive negotiation period before a
contractual relationship is cemented, the putative master developer, or the master
developer and the city together, may work to identify such a potential owner who can
generate revenue early in the development”). However, this potential justification for
pre-condemnation private involvement seems somewhat tenuous because it is possible to gauge the market’s interest in purchasing an asset without engaging in a sale or
a promise to sell. Cf. Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: Legal and Economic
Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 Brook
L Rev 583, 613 (2004) (describing how underwriters “buil[d] a book of tentative orders
reflecting each investor’s interest in a number of shares at a particular price from
which the lead underwriter will be able to gauge the level of demand for the issue and
thereby arrive at a more accurate offering price that may be set within or outside of the
estimated range”). Likewise, it would seem that a local government is capable of gauging the potential private interest in a project without committing to a particular developer. Moreover, some local governments select assembly sites without any private
involvement. For example, a number of cities, including Baltimore, Maryland, have
relied on Requests for Proposals (or “RFPs”), in which the condemnor takes property
without having any plan for its development and then requests proposals from private
developers. See Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 107-08 (cited in note 156) (discussing Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore City v Valsamaki, 916 A2d 324 (Md 2007)).
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a preferred developer, a local government should be able to rely on a
private developer in certain situations if it can provide a justification
for such involvement.166
As a general matter, however, the risk of impermissible favoritism
for this category of takings does not justify the potential benefits of
private involvement. Both pre-condemnation private involvement
and post-condemnation private involvement by a preferred developer
often raise the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without any corresponding benefit. Thus, “Category 3” takings, in which a private
development is based on public information, entail an elevated risk
of pretext; yet, it may be unnecessary for society to bear this risk.
4. Private Information—Private Development
There is also an elevated risk that a taking is pretextual if an assembly project is based on private information and executed by a
private developer. In this situation, private parties might be involved
before a condemnation occurs because private information may be
necessary for determining the optimal assembly site. Private parties
also might be involved after the condemnation occurs either because
the private party would otherwise be unwilling to provide information for determining the site or because the private party is better
able to develop the site.
Prohibiting pre-condemnation private involvement and postcondemnation involvement by a preferred developer might be an
effective approach for eliminating pretext in this category of takings
as well. That is, if the benefits of targeting pretext outweigh the opportunity costs of foregoing private participation, it might be desirable
to limit private involvement in both “Category 3” and “Category 4”
takings. Indeed, scholars who advocate the use of an auction system
appear to suggest that this type of system would be useful whenever
a private party is involved in the development.167
However, for takings that require private information to identify
the optimal site, there are two potential problems with this approach.
First, a local government sometimes may need to rely on private
involvement before the taking.168 Specifically, because the government does not have information regarding the optimal assembly
See Part V(A) (proposing burden-shifting framework in which the government
has the opportunity to proffer a non-pretextual reason for such private involvement);
cf. Kelo, 545 US at 493 (Kennedy concurring) (suggesting the possibility that a presumption of invalidity may be “rebuttable”).
167
See Shapiro and Pincus, Efficiency and Equity in the Assemblage of Land for
Public Use at *12-13 (cited in note 161).
168
See Part IV(A)(1).
166
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site, the government may have to rely on a developer to provide
this information.169 A developer also may have more of an incentive than the government to acquire this information. Eliminating
pre-condemnation private involvement might therefore eliminate
a potential advantage of private involvement. Second, the government sometimes may need to rely on a particular private party as the
preferred developer. Without being assured of the potential benefits
that accrue to the preferred developer after the taking, a developer
might have little incentive to provide beneficial information before
the taking.
Suppose that a private developer is aware of a promising opportunity for a new commercial development. The potential site of the
development, however, is excessively fragmented among dozens of
landowners. The local government may not have information regarding this opportunity or the requirements of a commercial development. If the government had to rely on its own information, the
development may never be built or, if it is built, it may be constructed
in a suboptimal location. By contrast, if pre-condemnation private
involvement is permitted, local officials might be able to capitalize
on the developer’s information in order to identify the optimal location and then rely on the developer’s expertise in order to execute the
development.170
As discussed above, the government could sever the private
involvement in the identification of the site from the private involvement in the development of the site.171 For example, the government
could hire a private developer solely to provide information about
the optimal location of a possible assembly site. It could then rely
on a different developer to execute the project once the site has been
assembled. However, as noted above, the administrative costs of
implementing a reward system or the transaction costs of entering
exploratory contracts might be relatively high.172 In any event, while
the government could choose to rely on two private parties—one
before the condemnation and one after the condemnation—such a
strategy is clearly not constitutionally required.
Admittedly, by allowing pre-condemnation private involvement
and post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer in
these types of takings, this approach to targeting pretext is potentially underinclusive. In certain circumstances, a local government
might claim that private information is necessary for an assembly
See id.
See Part IV(A)(1)-(2).
171
See Part IV(B)(2).
172
See id.
169
170
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Public Information
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Public
Development
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(no private involvement)
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Private
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Figure 2.

Private Information
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(no justification for precondemnation involvement

Minimal Risk
(no benefit to private parties)
(4)
Elevated Risk
(possible justification for precondemnation involvement)

Risk of Pretext in Four Categories of Takings

even though the private involvement is pretextual. Likewise, the
government might assert that it is necessary to designate a particular party as the preferred developer even though the developer could
have been selected through a competitive process such as an auction.
Being underinclusive in situations in which local governments do
not have adequate information may be necessary, however, because
otherwise judges would be charged with comparing the potential
costs and benefits of private involvement, a task that they have been
reluctant to perform.173 Thus, although “Category 4” takings entail
an elevated risk of pretext, it sometimes may be necessary for society
to bear this risk.
Overall, as Figure 2 indicates, the risk of a pretextual taking varies depending on whether a taking is a public or private development. When the taking involves a public development (Category 1 or
Category 2), the risk of favoritism is minimal. By contrast, when the
taking entails a private development (Category 3 or Category 4), the
risk of favoritism is elevated. Importantly, however, whether there
is a possible justification for this elevated level of risk depends on
whether private information is necessary for identifying the development site. When private information is unnecessary for identifying
the site (Category 3), there is generally no justification for either precondemnation private involvement or post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer. By contrast, when private information
173
See notes 52 & 71 and accompanying text. But cf. Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 63
(cited in note 23) (advancing theory of public use requirement that avoids “relying
on the imperfect information of either legislatures or courts”). However, even if this
approach is underinclusive for “Category 4” takings, it is still likely to be superior
to either relying on the timing of the identification of private parties, a test that is
both underinclusive and overinclusive, see Part III(A)(3), or the condemnor’s intent,
a test that is both underinclusive and entails the problems of disutility, futility, and
administrability, see Part III(B).
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is necessary for identifying the site (Category 4), a possible justification exists for certain types of private involvement.
V. A F R A M E W O R K B A S E D O N T I T L E V I I
A. Takings and Title VII
Identifying pretextual motivation is a concern in many areas of the
law besides eminent domain. One area in which pretext plays a
particularly prominent role is in employment discrimination cases
under Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,174 the
Supreme Court created a tripartite burden-shifting framework for
analyzing claims of discriminatory treatment.175 An employee may
prevail on a Title VII claim if she is able to produce direct evidence
of discrimination.176 If so, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework does not apply.177 However, an employee also may prevail
on a Title VII claim by producing indirect evidence of discrimination
and satisfying the burden-shifting test.178 Under this test, even if an
employer is able to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its employment action, the employee can still prove disparate
treatment by offering evidence that the employer’s explanation is
pretextual.179
Since McDonnell Douglas, this burden-shifting framework has
been extended from Title VII cases to several other contexts involving a concern about pretext. For example, in Batson v. Kentucky,180
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Title VII framework for
analyzing challenges to preemptory strikes.181 Likewise, several fed-

411 US 792 (1973).
See id at 802-05.
176
See Swierkiewicz v Sorema N. A., 534 US 506, 511 (2002) (“[I]f a plaintiff is able
to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the
elements of a prima facie case.”).
177
See Trans World Airlines, Inc v Thurston, 469 US 111, 121 (1985) (noting that
“the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination”).
178
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802 (setting forth requirements of a prima
facie case); see also Desert Palace, Inc v Costa, 539 US 90 (2003) (holding that direct
evidence of discrimination is not required to prove employment discrimination in
mixed-motive cases under Title VII).
179
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-05.
180
476 US 79 (1986).
181
See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson,
50 Stan L Rev 9, 23-24 (1997) (pointing out that “Batson’s procedural framework for
assessing whether a peremptory strike violates the equal protection principle, and
174
175
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eral courts of appeals have adopted the Title VII framework in analyzing discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.182 A number of circuits also have relied on the test in evaluating
gender discrimination claims under Title IX.183
In this section, I suggest that Title VII’s burden-shifting framework
can and should be adopted in the takings context to provide a practicable mechanism for identifying when private involvement becomes
pretextual. For takings claims arising under state law, the proposed
framework could be enacted by state legislatures or adopted by state
courts. For takings claims arising under federal law, the framework
could be implemented by Congress or adopted by federal courts.184
Whether under state or federal law, the burden-shifting test would
involve three steps: the condemnee’s prima facie case, the condemnor’s burden to rebut the prima facie case by offering a legitimate justification for private involvement, and the condemnee’s opportunity
to prove that the condemnor’s justification is pretextual.
1. Condemnee’s Prima Facie Case
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.185 In the takings conindeed the very term ‘pretext,’ are borrowed from Supreme Court opinions in employment discrimination cases arising under that civil rights law” (citing Batson, 476 US
at 94 n 18, 96 n 19, 98 n 21)); see also Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Comment, Johnson
v California and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 Fordham L Rev 3333,
3346 n 83 (2006) (“Since adopting the three-part framework in Batson, the Court has
regularly relied on Title VII cases to shed light on the burden-shifting process.” (collecting cases)).
182
See Raytheon Co v Hernandez, 540 US 44, 49 n 3 (2003) (noting that “Courts
of Appeals have consistently utilized this burden-shifting approach when reviewing
motions for summary judgment in disparate-treatment cases” (citing Pugh v Attica,
259 F3d 619, 626 (7th Cir 2001) (applying burden-shifting approach to a disparatetreatment claim under the American with Disabilities Act))).
183
See, for example, Brine v Univ of Iowa, 90 F3d 271, 276 (8th Cir 1996) (concluding that the Title VII standards should apply to claims arising under Title IX); Lipsett
v Univ of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 897 (1st Cir 1988) (same); see also Catherine
Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A Review of Recent Developments, 30 JC & UL
75, 117 (2003) (“Both Title VII and Title IX employ the burden-shifting framework
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green.”).
184
Most federal takings claims will arise in state court (as in Kelo) because of
the procedural requirements that apply to takings claims after Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172 (1985),
and San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 545 US 323 (2005). See William A. Fletcher, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings Law Now Belongs to the
States, 46 Santa Clara L Rev 767, 777-78 (2006).
185
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802.
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text, the primary concern is favoritism. Thus, in the first step, a condemnee would be required to demonstrate that a taking involves the
possibility of favoritism, a showing that could be made in one of
two ways.
First, the condemnee could provide direct evidence of favoritism.
Direct evidence of favoritism might include a “smoking gun” such
as an email exchange between a local official and a private developer
that indicates that the actual purpose of the taking is to benefit the
developer. As in the Title VII context, in which it is often difficult for
plaintiffs to provide direct evidence of discrimination,186 it is rather
unlikely that a condemnee would be able to produce direct evidence
of favoritism.187 However, if the condemnee is able to produce such
evidence, the condemnee would be entitled to prevail without proving the other elements of a prima facie case.188
Second, the condemnee could establish a prima facie case of favoritism through indirect evidence. To establish a prima facie case, the
condemnee would be required to prove two elements. First, the condemnee would be required to demonstrate that the project involves a
private party. The involvement of a private party is a logical element
of the prima facie case because the risk of pretext is minimal without
private involvement.189 Second, the condemnee would be required
to show that, as a result of the assembly, the private party might
obtain a distinct benefit. A possible benefit to the private party is
also a logical element of the prima facie case because favoritism is
only possible in a project in which a private party expects to obtain
an advantage.190
Clearly, a condemnee would not be able to establish a prima facie
case for every taking. For example, if a local government attempts to
take land for a public school, a condemnee’s claim that the taking is
pretextual would fail at step one. Here, no private party is involved.
Likewise, if a development corporation, which is typically a private
See Hoffman v Caterpillar, Inc, 256 F3d 568, 576 (7th Cir 2001) (“Direct evidence
cases, like this one, are very rare in the employment discrimination context because
employers are generally very careful to avoid statements that suggest discriminatory
intent—whether their true intentions are discriminatory or not.”); see also Price
Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor concurring) (“[T]he entire
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”).
187
Cf. Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 169 (DC 2007)
(pointing out that “government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason”).
188
See notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
189
See Part IV (B)(1).
190
See Part IV (B)(2)-(4).
186
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nonprofit entity,191 attempts to condemn land for a public development, a condemnee’s claim that the taking is pretextual would fail
at step one as well. Here, although the project does involve a private
party (the development corporation), the development corporation
is a nonprofit entity and does not expect to obtain a distinct benefit
from the taking.192
By contrast, if a local government or development corporation
planned to condemn several parcels and then transfer these parcels
to a private developer, a condemnee might be able to establish a
prima facie case. Such a project involves a private party (the developer), and the developer anticipates obtaining a distinct benefit (the
expected profits from the development). As in the Title VII context,
the burden on the condemnee to establish a prima facie case would
be relatively light.193 Indeed, private parties in both “Category 3” and
“Category 4” takings are normally willing to assist the government
only because they anticipate obtaining some type of benefit. Thus,
private involvement in the development of a site would usually result in a condemnee’s being able to satisfy step one.
2. Condemnor’s Burden
Under McDonnell Douglas, if an employee is able to satisfy step one,
the burden shifts to the employer. Step two requires the employer to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
action.194 By analogy, in the takings context, if the condemnee is able
to satisfy step one, the burden would shift to the condemnor. Step
two would require the condemnor to articulate a legitimate justification for private involvement in the taking.
Importantly, if the condemnor simply asserted one or more of the
traditional public purposes, such as eliminating urban blight, preserving open space, generating new jobs, retaining existing jobs, or
bolstering the tax base, that assertion by itself would not be sufficient to satisfy step two. While many courts have held that these
justifications satisfy the public use requirement, such justifications
do not indicate whether, and to what extent, private involvement is
See, for example, Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 473 (2005) (noting that
“respondent New London Development Corporation” is “a private nonprofit entity”).
192
Id.
193
Cf. St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 506 (1993) (characterizing the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas as “minimal”); Zamora v Elite Logistics, Inc, 478 F3d 1160, 1171 (10th Cir 2007) (noting that
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII is “so
light that only the most baseless of claims fails to satisfy it”).
194
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-03.
191
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necessary for an assembly. For example, while an assembly based on
blight may involve a private party that executes the development,
the existence of blight by itself does not determine whether precondemnation private involvement or post-condemnation involvement by a preferred developer is warranted.195 Thus, in attempting to
justify private involvement, the condemnor could not rely solely on
one or more of the general justifications for eminent domain.
Rather, the condemnor would be required to provide a specific
justification for why a particular type of private involvement is necessary for the project at issue. For example, if a local government
is able to show that a particular private party is necessary because
of the information that party possesses and that pre-condemnation
private involvement is not possible without designating the party
as the post-condemnation developer, then the government might be
able to satisfy its burden. Similarly, if the government is able to show
that post-condemnation private involvement by a specific developer
is necessary because that developer is the only firm technically capable of developing a particular site, then the condemnor also might
be able to satisfy its burden. In each case, however, the government
would be required to provide a specific justification for why precondemnation private involvement or post-condemnation involvement by a particular developer is necessary for that project.
3. Proving Pretext
Under McDonnell Douglas, if the employer meets its burden in
step two, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears.
However, in step three, the employee can still prove disparate treatment by demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.196 Similarly, in the takings context, if the condemnor is able
to meet its burden in step two, then the burden would shift back to
the condemnee. To prevail in step three, the condemnee would be
required to demonstrate that the condemnor’s proffered justification
for private involvement is pretextual.
The primary way in which a condemnee could demonstrate pretext at step three is to show that pre-condemnation private involvement or post-condemnation involvement by a preferred private party
is actually unnecessary. For example, the condemnee could establish
that a taking was pretextual by showing that the private developer
involved in the project could have been, but was not, selected after the
condemnation through a competitive process such as an auction.
195
196

See Part V (B)(1).
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 804-05.
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As discussed above, when a local government is capable of selecting a private party through a competitive process but decides not to
do so the taking should be considered pretextual.197 By not relying on
such a process, the government creates an elevated risk of impermissible favoritism. This elevated risk of favoritism is also not offset
by the possibility of any countervailing public benefits. If the condemnee is able to establish that the condemnor’s asserted purpose for
private involvement cannot be justified, then the court should rule
that the condemnee has satisfied step three and declare the taking to
be pretextual.
On the other hand, if a local government does rely on a competitive process, then there is little or no risk of impermissible favoritism.198 In these circumstances, a private party is not involved in the
project before the condemnation, and a particular private party is not
selected by the government after the condemnation. Selection of a
private developer through a neutral process ensures that the condemnation does not entail impermissible favoritism. The court should
rule, therefore, that the private involvement is not pretextual.
B. Applications
1. Blighted Areas
When a local government condemns property because it is blighted,
the government typically elects to redevelop the land rather than
leaving it vacant. The government often engages in this type of
redevelopment by transferring or leasing the land to a private developer.199 Yet, this type of private involvement can increase the risk
that a taking is pretextual.200 Indeed, many courts have been hesitant
to approve blight designations in cases in which the circumstances
indicate that the taking may be pretextual.201 Nevertheless, the government may have an interest in relying on a private party to develop
a site after the blight has been eliminated.202
See Part IV(B)(3).
See id.
199
See Part IV(A)(2); see also Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 67 (cited in note 156) (“Developers often initiate economic development projects, and reach tentative understandings
with redevelopment agencies before the agency hires the consulting firm that will
find whatever blight the law requires.”); Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at
861 (cited in note 23) (“In most renewal projects, . . . the agency itself did not act as a
developer. Instead, it typically would sell a cleared parcel to a private firm, subject to
covenants designed to achieve plan objectives.”).
200
See Part IV (B)(3)-(4).
201
See, for example, Franco, 930 A2d at 169.
202
Most courts have concluded that eliminating blight is a “public purpose” and
that previously blighted land can be transferred to one or more private parties. The
197
198

This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Daniel B. Kelly

221

In addition to deciding whether or not to rely on a private party to
develop a previously blighted area, the government also must make
the initial determination of whether an area is actually blighted. Factors for determining blight have varied across time203 and continue to
vary across jurisdictions.204 Yet a common feature of blight is that it
is usually observable. For example, in Berman v. Parker, the National
Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) declared an area in Southwest
Washington, D.C. blighted because, among other things, “57.8% of
the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked
electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, [and] 83.8%
lacked central heating.”205 Modern characteristics of blight include
everything from lack of a “two-car attached garage”206 to a yard that
failed to meet “minimum size requirements,”207 but these types of
characteristics are observable as well.
Because blight factors are usually observable, the local government itself is generally able to identify blighted areas without relyMichigan Supreme Court, in overruling Poletown, carved out an exception for blight
condemnations. See County of Wayne v Hathcock, 684 NW2d 765, 782-83 (Mich
2004). Likewise, the dissenters in Kelo distinguished blight condemnations from economic development takings on the basis that targeting blight involves eliminating
an affirmative harm. See Kelo, 545 US at 500 (O’Connor dissenting). For an argument
that eminent domain is an undesirable mechanism for revitalizing blighted neighborhoods, see Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 Urb Law
833, 833 (2007) (contending that, although “blackletter law provides that the presence
of blight justifies condemnation, . . . ‘blight condemnation’ is dubious at best, both in
theory and practice”); cf. Kelo, 545 US at 520 (Thomas dissenting) (asserting that “if
the slums at issue [in Berman] were truly ‘blighted,’ then state nuisance law, not the
power of eminent domain, would provide the appropriate remedy.” (citations omitted)).
203
See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 265-66 (cited in note 4) (“Early blight cases in
the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that closely fit the layperson’s
intuitive notion of ‘blight’: dilapidated, dangerous, disease-ridden neighborhoods. . . .
In the years since those early cases, many states have expanded the concept of blight
to encompass almost any area where economic development could potentially be
increased.”). After Kelo, several states have tightened their statutory definitions of
blight. See Eagle, 39 Urb Law at 835 (cited in note 202) (discussing “recent statutory
limitations on blight”).
204
For an overview of post-Kelo definitions of blight, see generally Somin, 93 Minn
L Rev at 2120-31 (cited in note 23); for an earlier survey, see Hudson Hayes Luce, The
Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 Real Property, Probate &
Trust J 389 (2000).
205
348 US 26, 30 (1954).
206
Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 Colum L Rev 883, 910 n 118 (2007) (citing 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain
(CBS television broadcast Sept 28, 2003)).
207
Morriss, 17 S Ct Econ Rev at 237 (cited in note 8) (quoting Patricia E. Salkin and
Lora A. Lucero, Community Redevelopment, Public Use, and Eminent Domain, 37
Urb Law 201, 219 (2005) (citing 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain (CBS television broadcast Sept 28, 2003)).
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ing on private developers. Consequently, pre-condemnation private
involvement is typically unnecessary. Moreover, although the local
government may wish to rely on a private party to develop a previously blighted area, the government normally does not need to rely
on a preferred private developer. Instead, the government is capable
of using an auction or other mechanism to select a developer without
creating a risk of impermissible favoritism.208
As a result, an assembly project involving blight condemnations,
such as the takings at issue in Berman,209 could be analyzed under
the burden-shifting framework discussed above.210 Indeed, the condemnee in Berman, an owner of a non-blighted department store in
Washington, D.C., may have been able to establish a prima facie case
of favoritism. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
(the “Agency”) intended to transfer the assembly site to private developers,211 satisfying the first element of a prima facie case,212 and those
developers would have expected to obtain a benefit from redeveloping the site,213 satisfying the second element of a prima facie case.214
If Berman did satisfy step one, the burden would have shifted to
the Agency as condemnor. The Agency would have been required
to provide a legitimate reason for the particular type of private involvement that was expected to occur. A simple assertion by the
Agency that many of the properties within the development area
were “blighted” would not have been sufficient. If the Agency had
argued that it was necessary to rely on private developers before the
taking, the Agency may have had a difficult time justifying its position. The existence of blight in Southwest Washington, D.C. was so
apparent that the Agency did not need to rely on private information
to identify the site.215 Moreover, because “[n]inety-nine percent of
the buildings in the Southwest were torn down,”216 it does not appear
See Shapiro and Pincus, Efficiency and Equity in the Assemblage of Land for
Public Use at *15 (cited in note 161).
209
Berman, 348 US at 26.
210
See Part V(A). For an overview of redevelopment efforts in Washington, DC in
the 1950s, see generally Howard Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, DC 155-65 (Johns Hopkins U
1995).
211
See Berman, 348 US at 31 (noting Berman’s objection that his property “will be
put into the project under the management of a private, not a public, agency and redeveloped for private, not public, use”); id at 33 (noting that “one of the means chosen is
the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area”).
212
See text accompanying note 189.
213
See Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty at 155 (cited in note 210) (describing
the “enthusiasm of local developers for slum clearance”).
214
See text accompanying note 190.
215
See text accompanying note 205.
216
Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty at 163 (cited in note 210).
208
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that the parcels at issue required the specific expertise of particular
developers after the taking.217 In order to carry its burden at step two,
the Agency most likely would have had to establish that any private
involvement would occur only after the condemnation of the site and
that such private involvement would not entail the use of preferred
developers.
Assuming the Agency was able to provide a legitimate reason for
post-condemnation private involvement, the burden would have
then shifted back to Berman. Berman would have had the opportunity to offer evidence that the expected involvement of private
developers was pretextual. For example, Berman may have been able
to argue that the Agency was able, but failed, to select private developers through a competitive process. Based on the district court’s
recitation of the facts, it is not clear whether the Agency’s bidding
process for the site was, in fact, entirely competitive.218 If the Agency
failed to rely on a competitive process, the selection of developers
might have entailed an elevated risk of pretext and Berman may have
prevailed at step three.219
It is also possible, as in Berman, that the government might
attempt to designate an entire area as “blighted” even though the area
includes both blighted and non-blighted parcels.220 In analyzing these
cases, courts should identify whether or not the blighted and nonblighted properties are intermingled. Where the blighted and nonblighted properties are intermingled, as in Berman,221 the analysis of
pretext should proceed as if the entire area was blighted. Accordingly,
assuming that the jurisdiction permits condemnations on the basis
217
Cf. id at 156 (discussing a number of plans and noting that “the most influential
plan proposed for the Southwest was one envisioning wholesale redevelopment”).
218
See Schneider v District of Columbia, 117 F Supp 705, 708 (DDC 1953) (threejudge court), aff’d sub nom, Berman v Parker, 348 US 26 (1954) (noting that the
“Agency advertised for proposals to negotiate for the purchase or lease of land in the
project area” and “[a]fter due consideration the Agency accepted the proposals of five
bidders who owned property in the area . . . , each to repurchase its present property,
and of the Bush Construction Company for the remainder of the area”).
219
The urban renewal project at issue in Berman actually evolved from a plan with
“the more modest goal of improving the area for its existing residents,” Gillette, Jr.,
Between Justice and Beauty at 272 n 55 (cited in note 210) (citing report of the community meeting on Southwest in the Washington Star, Nov. 21, 1952), to an initiative
that “encouraged planners to shift to ‘the maximum-optimum’ development proposal
offered by the New York real estate developer William Zeckendorf,” id (quoting correspondence from John Searles to James Goode, July 15, 1983).
220
See, for example, Berman, 348 US at 34; Franco, 930 A2d at 171; see also Lefcoe,
17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 825 (cited in note 71) (explaining that “[c]ourts usually
approve takings of unblighted properties located within blighted areas if local officials
believe the taking to be necessary for achieving the redevelopment plan” and citing
Berman as an example).
221
348 US at 34.
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of blight, private involvement in the taking should be analyzed under
the burden-shifting framework described above. By contrast, where
the blighted and non-blighted properties are not intermingled, as in
Goldstein v. Pataki,222 the court should invoke a “severance” doctrine and analyze both areas separately.223 Accordingly, in the absence
of any controlling statutory law,224 condemnation of the blighted portion should be analyzed as a taking in a blighted area, and condemnation of the non-blighted portion should be analyzed as a taking in a
redevelopment district225 or a new assembly.226
2. Redevelopment Districts
The definition of a redevelopment district, like the definition of a
blighted area, varies by jurisdiction. Certain states include blighted
parcels in redevelopment districts, while other states explicitly distinguish between blight and redevelopment.227 Redevelopment districts that do not include blight often target parcels that are “deteriorating.” Deterioration, like blight, is a determination based on
the physical characteristics of existing structures, so it is typically
observable as well.
Because deterioration is typically observable, the government
usually does not need to rely on a private party for information
regarding the assembly site. For takings in redevelopment districts,
pre-condemnation private involvement is thus generally unnecessary. Although a local government may wish to utilize a private party
516 F3d 50, 53 (2d Cir 2008) (noting that, although approximately half of the
project site lies within “a heavily blighted area,” the site also includes “an adjacent
parcel of land with less blight . . . that is currently held by private parties”).
223
Cf. Gallenthin Realty Dev, Inc v Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A2d 447, 464 (NJ
2007) (holding that, “although non-blighted parcels may be included in a redevelopment plan if necessary for rehabilitation of a larger blighted area, the record contains
no evidence suggesting that the Gallenthin property is integral to the larger BP/Dow
Redevelopment Area” (internal citation omitted)).
224
Since Kelo, a few states have explicitly prohibited the government from including non-blighted properties in blighted areas. See Dana, 32 Vt L Rev at 168 n 72 (cited
in note 28) (noting statutes in Minnesota and Wisconsin); Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at
51-52 (cited in note 156) (describing amended North Carolina statute). Other states
have significantly restricted the taking of non-blighted properties in blighted areas.
See, for example, Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 826-27 & n 132 (cited in note 71)
(discussing West Virginia statute).
225
See Part V(B)(2).
226
See Part V(B)(3).
227
See, for example, City of Minneapolis v Wurtele, 291 NW2d 386, 388 (Minn
1980) (“The Development District Law, Minn. Stat. ch. 472A (1978), was designed to
allow municipalities to designate as ‘development districts’ areas which, while not yet
‘blighted,’ show a trend toward decreasing economic utility and tax base.”).
222
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for the post-condemnation development, the government does not
need to select a preferred developer. Instead, the government could
use an auction or other competitive mechanism to select a developer
without creating a risk of impermissible favoritism.228
Moreover, in some cases, redevelopment districts already exist.
For these districts, like districts in which deterioration is observable, pre-condemnation private involvement is unnecessary. The
local government already knows the boundaries of the assembly
site. Similarly, if a condemnor attempts to expand an existing redevelopment district to justify additional development outside of the
district’s boundaries,229 private involvement should also be limited.
In these cases, the primary development site has already been identified so private developers normally will not have any advantage over
the local government in identifying areas adjacent to the site that are
suitable for redevelopment.
3. New Assemblies
New assemblies differ from condemnations in both blighted areas
and redevelopment districts. For new assemblies, a private developer,
rather than the local government, may have information regarding the
desirability of a particular site. Before the condemnation, the government may therefore need to rely on a developer for a non-pretextual
purpose. After the condemnation, the government also may need to
rely on a particular developer because a developer might be unwilling
to provide information about the optimal site if the developer does
not expect to obtain some benefit from the assembly.
As an empirical matter, local governments may have information
regarding the optimal site for certain new assemblies. After all, local
officials have access to land records, and these records might indicate
that an area is excessively fragmented. The burden-shifting framework is thus potentially underinclusive: it allows pre-condemnation
private involvement for new assemblies even though, for at least
some of these projects, the government’s information might have
been sufficient to identify the site. Such a framework also means
that, all other things being equal, condemnations involving nonblighted land would be subject to less scrutiny than condemnations
involving blighted land. As a result, a developer may have an incentive to propose a new assembly rather than developing a previously
See notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
See Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 64-65 (cited in note 156) (pointing out that “[m]any
redevelopment agencies have included already commenced projects into a newly
formed redevelopment project area” and thus “stretch[ed] the boundaries of an existing project area to encompass a purely private development about to be built”).
228
229
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blighted parcel even though, from a social perspective, development
of the blighted parcel might be more desirable.
However, the framework also has two implications that may mitigate this potential concern regarding underinclusiveness. First, by
subjecting condemnations in which private information is unnecessary to a more stringent test, the framework creates an incentive
for local governments not to label parcels as “blighted” areas or
“redevelopment” zones. These labels can stifle economic development and cause property values to depreciate.230 Second, the framework may be appropriate in light of the political economy of takings.
The framework is more permissive for those situations (viz., new
assemblies) in which there is likely to be greater political resistance
and more restrictions on the use of eminent domain and less permissive for those situations (viz., blighted areas and redevelopment
districts) in which there is likely to be less political resistance and
fewer restrictions on the use of eminent domain.231 Indeed, after Kelo,
many states have eliminated or restricted the use of eminent domain
for new projects in which the sole justification is “economic development.”232 The major post-Kelo issue has been to what extent local
officials may rely on expansive definitions of blight to condemn land
for private parties.233 This framework eliminates the possibility of
pretext in precisely those situations in which impermissible favoritism is most likely to still be a significant concern.
4. Positive Externalities
Assembly projects also entail the possibility of positive externalities. The potential beneficiaries in assemblies with externalities are
230
Cf. Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 821 (cited in note 71) (noting that findings of “blight” are “occasionally challenged by homeowners fearing that an official
designation of blight will hurt property values” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
231
Cf. David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor
After Kelo, 101 Nw U L Rev 365, 378-82 (2007) (discussing the “legal privileging of
blight condemnation (as compared to economic development condemnations)” and
concluding that “[t]he effects of the legal differentiation . . . will not be merely expressive but also, straightforwardly, economic: this differentiation may change the economics of land development so as to produce more condemnations in poorer areas by
making land assembly more expensive in middle-class neighborhoods relative to poor
neighborhoods”).
232
See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 137 (cited in note 31) (“Almost all post-Kelo
reform proposals would extend property rule protection against eminent domain,
either by prohibiting ‘economic development’ takings outright or by limiting the
funds available for such takings.”).
233
See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2120-31 (cited in note 23) (discussing broad blight
exemptions).
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not only the private parties who develop the assembly site but also
the private parties who might obtain spillovers from the project.
The issue of externalities must therefore be examined from the perspective of both private developers who are considering whether to
develop parcels and private beneficiaries who may profit from an
assembly’s external effects.
If an assembly project entails a positive externality, a private developer may be unwilling to execute the project even though it would
be socially desirable.234 To solve this problem, the government can
provide a subsidy to the party that is ultimately selected as the
developer.235 A subsidy is even compatible with selecting a developer
through an auction. As long as the subsidy is set correctly and the
parties who are bidding to become the developer know that the eventual developer will receive the subsidy, then each developer’s private
incentive to bid for the project will be aligned with the optimal social
incentive. Consequently, the possible existence of a positive externality is not an adequate justification for either pre-condemnation
private involvement or post-condemnation private involvement by
a preferred developer.
An additional problem arises, however, in considering the potential external effects of an assembly project on other private parties.
Because of these effects, private parties who are not directly involved
in the project—either in providing information about the assembly
site or in developing the site—may still have an incentive to lobby
for a particular project or to threaten to relocate if a particular project
does not occur. As noted above, this type of strategic behavior is possible in situations involving public developments that rely on public
information.236 Yet, it is also possible in situations involving private
developments such as the assembly project at issue in Kelo.
Indeed, in Kelo, it is noteworthy that there were two private entities that expected to benefit from the redevelopment project: Corcoran Jennison (the potential developer of the assembly site) and
Pfizer Corporation (the recent purchaser of a nearby parcel).237 The
Supreme Court noted that the New London Development Corporation was “negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison” and that these negotiations were initiated “[w]hile this litigation was pending before the Superior Court.”238 Corcoran Jennison’s
involvement thus occurred relatively late in the assembly process.
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 42 (cited in note 23).
See id at 44-45.
236
See notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
237
See note 96.
238
Kelo, 545 US at 476 n 4.
234
235
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By contrast, Pfizer’s interest in the project was apparent from the
very beginning of the process.239 While Pfizer’s arrival in New London
had the potential to assist in the city’s revitalization, Pfizer was also
in a position to obtain a significant benefit from the spillover effects
of the assembly project.240
Ultimately, although Justice Thomas characterized the project
as being “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation,”241 the
Court deferred to the trial court’s determination that there was “no
evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.”242 The Court therefore concluded that “the City’s development plan was not adopted
‘to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.’ ”243 However,
additional evidence that was revealed after the Court’s decision indicates the pervasiveness of Pfizer’s pre-condemnation involvement
with various state and local officials.244 This evidence suggests that
pretext is a distinct possibility even when a private developer is not
the private party being favored. Thus, under the burden-shifting
framework, a condemnee could satisfy the first element of the prima
facie case by establishing the involvement of a private beneficiary
other than the private developer.
5. Changed Circumstances
Another situation in which pretext may arise is if local officials condemn land for a traditional public use (e.g., to build a park) and then
announce that, rather than using the land for its original purpose,
the parcel will be transferred to a developer for a private project.245 In
Id at 473 (describing Pfizer’s 1998 announcement to build a “$300 million
research facility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull”).
240
See Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 Pepp L Rev 335, 342 (2006) (“This was a case, not of an independently
conceived and executed municipal redevelopment effort that incidentally benefited
Pfizer when it came upon the scene, but of a jointly planned project that would
avowedly inure to Pfizer’s substantial benefit.”).
241
Kelo, 545 US at 506 (Thomas dissenting).
242
Id at 478.
243
Id (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 US 229, 245 (1984)).
244
See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 237 (cited in note 4) (“Despite longstanding
denials by both Pfizer executives and New London officials, documents obtained by
The Day through state Freedom of Information Act requests show that the NLDC
condemnations were undertaken in large part as a result of extensive Pfizer lobbying
of state and local officials. Pfizer representatives apparently demanded the redevelopment plan and its associated takings as a quid pro quo for its agreement to build a
new headquarters in New London.” (citing Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort
Trumbull Plan, The Day (Oct. 16, 2005))).
245
See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 814 (cited in note 71) (“Suppose a redevelopment agency disregards its plan entirely, claims it is taking the property for one
purpose or owner, and conveys it to another for an entirely different use?”).
239
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these cases, officials are likely to claim that the transfer to a private
party is justified because of a change in circumstances. A number
of courts have permitted such takings even though the condemnor
knew beforehand that the ultimate use would differ from the original
public purpose.246
Conversely, local officials may attempt to rely on a past factual
finding or previous blight determination to justify a project even
though circumstances actually have changed. For example, in Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission,247 the redevelopment
commission attempted to sell land to two developers in 1997 based
on an urban renewal plan from 1988.248 Similarly, in Arvada Urban
Renewal Authority v. Columbine Professional Plaza Association
(AURA),249 the urban renewal authority asserted that it retained
the power to condemn land within an area previously designated
as blighted “even though the entire parcel ha[d] been sold by the
authority, developed in accordance with its urban renewal plan, and
formally released by the authority.”250
Allowing a local government to exercise unfettered discretion in
altering its previous plans or to rely on archaic factual findings in
justifying its current plans would increase the likelihood of a pretextual taking. Fortunately, the possibility of pretext in these types
of condemnations is typically easier to detect than other types of
pretext. Although officials initially may claim that a taking is for one
purpose, the subsequent transfer of the parcel to a private developer
for a different purpose provides an objective, and easily observable,
indication of impermissible favoritism.
Moreover, in response to these attempts to circumvent the condemnation process, some states have enacted constitutional amendments or statutory provisions that seek to prevent transfers to private parties based on changed circumstances. These restrictions give
prior owners an option to repurchase their condemned land if the
government is no longer using the land for its original public purpose.251 State courts, including the Connecticut Supreme Court in

246
See id (“Professor Kanner recounts numerous cases where this happened, and
courts refused to grant relief to the deceived owners—even when the agency knew at
the time it was promulgating a plan that it would soon disregard.” (citing Kanner, 39
Urb Law at 545-46 (cited in note 24))).
247
790 A2d 1167 (Conn 2002).
248
Id at 1170-72.
249
85 P3d 1066 (Colo 2004) (en banc).
250
Id at 1067.
251
See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 815 (cited in note 71) (“[M]any states even
before Kelo had enacted statutes and constitutional amendments granting owners of
property previously taken an option to repurchase once the acquiring agency declares
the land to be surplus, no longer needed by the government and potentially available
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Aposporos and the Colorado Supreme Court in AURA, also have
been active in prohibiting transfers that are based on archaic factual
findings.252 Indeed, the holdings in Aposporos and AURA provide further evidence that state courts are becoming increasingly aware that
private involvement is sometimes pretextual.253
6. One-to-One Transfers
While concerns regarding pretext arise most frequently in assembly
projects, there is also a potential for pretext in situations involving
one-to-one transfers.254 Many of the pre-Kelo cases in which courts
held that a taking is pretextual involved such transfers.255 In Kelo itself,
the Court warned that “a one-to-one transfer of property, executed
outside the confines of an integrated development plan, . . . would
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot . . . .”256
In a one-to-one transfer, the condemnor attempts to take property
from private party A and transfer it to private party B. Favoritism is
possible because B has an incentive to convince the government to
invoke eminent domain on its behalf if B’s acquisition costs would be
lower through eminent domain than voluntary exchange. This type
for sale to the bidding public. Post-Kelo, other states are enacting such laws.” (citing
Lynda J. Oswald, Can the Condemnee Regain Its Property if the Condemnor Abandons the Public Use? 39 Urb Law 671, 680 (2007))).
252
See Aposporos, 790 A2d at 1175 (“We cannot conclude . . . that a redevelopment
agency may make an initial finding of blight and rely on that finding indefinitely to
amend and extend a redevelopment plan to respond to conditions that did not exist,
or to accomplish objectives that were not contemplated, at the time that the original
plan was adopted.”); AURA, 85 P3d at 1067 (“[O]nce a parcel within a redevelopment
area has been sold, developed, and released in this manner, an urban renewal authority
may not exercise its condemnation power over any part of that parcel absent renewed
findings of blight by the appropriate authority.”).
253
Cf. Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 12) (surveying “all reported
appellate cases decided between Berman v Parker and January 1, 1986, that involved a
contested public use question” and finding that “[s]tate courts . . . seem more willing
to depart from Berman’s virtual abandonment of judicial review”); Corey J. Wilk, The
Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39
Real Prop Prob & Tr J 251, 258 (2004) (updating Merrill’s survey and finding a similar
percentage of state court decisions that held that a condemnation violated the public
use requirement).
254
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 54 n 253 (cited in note 23) (noting that “municipalities and private developers also use eminent domain for the purpose of redeveloping single parcels of land”).
255
See Aaron v Target Corp., 269 F Supp 2d 1162 (ED Mo 2003), rev’d on other
grounds, 356 F3d 768 (8th Cir 2003); 99 Cents Only Stores v Lancaster Redev Agency,
237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001); Sw Ill Dev Auth v Nat’l City Envtl, LLC, 768 NE2d
1, 10 (Ill 2002).
256
Kelo, 545 US at 487 (emphasis added).
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of private involvement may lead to the same problems of corruption,
secondary rent seeking, and threats to relocate as in assembly situations.257
Yet, one-to-one transfers differ from assembly projects in a fundamental respect: unlike assembly projects, one-to-one transfers do
not involve the holdout problem.258 For this reason, such transfers
usually can be accomplished through consensual, rather than forced,
exchange. Consensual exchange is beneficial here not only because
it ensures that transfers are welfare-enhancing but also because it
eliminates the possibility of pretext. Thus, private involvement in
the takings process should be reserved only for certain types of assembly projects.
One-to-one transfers could involve the problem of bilateral monopoly. In a bilateral monopoly, a situation involving a single buyer
and a single seller, the buyer and seller both have an incentive to
obtain as much of the surplus as possible. Strategic bargaining may
increase transaction costs and, in some instances, such costs may
surpass the benefits of the transaction.259 Consequently, a limited
number of situations may exist in which eminent domain is necessary for a one-to-one transfer. For instance, when an individual owns
a landlocked parcel, courts will sometimes grant an easement by
necessity.260 The justification for such an easement is the potential
bilateral monopoly problem that might exist between the landlocked
owner and her neighbor.261
In most circumstances, however, the bilateral monopoly problem does not justify one-to-one takings on behalf of private parties.
257
See Part II(A); see also Gillette, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 20 (cited in note 24) (“Just as
spot zoning raises concerns that the person who got the exception had the fix in, . . .
so too are the conditions for deference relaxed where the takings decision implicates
so few parcels that one reasonably fears a heightened risk of abuse.”).
258
See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 54 n 253 (cited in note 23) (pointing out that
“private parties actually confront fewer bargaining problems for acquiring single properties than assembling multiple properties because the holdout problem disappears”);
see also Law Professors Amicus Brief at *19 (cited in note 83) (arguing that “no holdout
problem can arise in one-to-one takings”).
259
See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 75 (cited in note 12) (“Such strategic bargaining
in a bilateral monopoly situation increases the project’s transaction costs, and if the
transaction costs approach or exceed the project’s gains, the [project] may never be
built.”).
260
See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va L Rev 1333, 1339
n 8 (1991) (noting that the “doctrine of easement by necessity . . . permits one property
owner to use another’s land when this use is found ‘necessary’ to the enjoyment of the
first owner’s land, as it might when a landlocked owner has no other means of access
to his property”).
261
See Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 Colum L Rev 55, 85
(1987) (discussing “the bilateral-monopoly justification for easements by necessity”).
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Often, a property owner will have other alternatives that prevent the
owner’s neighbor from attempting to extract the entire surplus. For
example, in 99 Cents Only, Costco could have expanded its store
in a different direction without demanding that the redevelopment
agency condemn 99 Cents Only’s leasehold interest.262 Therefore,
there was no bilateral monopoly problem and no need for a private
taking. Similarly, in Southwest Illinois Development Authority v.
National City Environmental (SWIDA),263 the race track could have
built a parking garage instead of requesting that the development
authority take the land of its neighbor, a recycling facility, for a new
parking lot.264 Once again, there was no bilateral monopoly problem
and no need for a private taking. In highlighting these alternatives,
the courts in both 99 Cents Only and SWIDA seemed to be relying
implicitly on a type of least-restrictive-alternative requirement: if a
private party attempts to utilize eminent domain to achieve a private
objective, but the objective could be achieved in an alternative way,
the taking is presumed to be pretextual.
7. “Same-Use” Takings
One-to-one transfers raise another possibility: namely, a condemnation may be pretextual not only because a private party is particularly favored but also because a party is particularly disfavored.265 A
local government might decide to exercise eminent domain because
it dislikes an owner or disapproves of the way in which the owner is
utilizing her land.266 While discerning whether a particular party is
disfavored may be even more difficult than determining whether a
particular party is favored,267 one indication that a taking involves a
See 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F Supp 2d at 1129 (“It is . . . undisputed that
Costco could have easily expanded within the Power Center onto adjacent property
without displacing 99 Cents at all but refused to do so.”).
263
768 NE2d 1 (Ill 2002).
264
Id at 10 (pointing out that “other options were available to Gateway that could
have addressed many of the problems” and that “Gateway could have built a parking garage structure on its existing property rather than develop the land owned
by NCE”).
265
Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev L
& Econ 125, 137 (1992) (concluding that “the takings clause can be defended as a barrier against a serious form of discrimination against politically disfavored groups”).
266
See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 47 (cited in note 44) (discussing situations
in which “the condemning authority condemns to prevent an undesirable use—or, at
least, one undesired by the condemnor or its most vocal constituents—be it a landfill,
low-income housing, a rehabilitation facility, or any other NIMBY-triggering use”).
267
Cf. id (“Although public use itself is a difficult concept for courts to wrest with,
the non-use cases seem to pose even tougher analytical hurdles for the courts.”).
262

This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Daniel B. Kelly

233

disfavored party is if the land’s post-condemnation use is equivalent
to the land’s pre-condemnation use.
For example, shortly after Kelo, local officials in North Hills,
New York attempted to condemn Deepdale Golf Club, a private
golf course, and convert it into a public golf course.268 One Deepdale
member asked: “Someone can take your golf course, and give it to
someone else as a golf course?”269 The threatened condemnation of
Deepdale sparked widespread opposition, with critics pointing out
that the condemnation makes “no economic sense.”270 Eventually,
the New York State Assembly enacted legislation that prohibits officials from condemning recreational facilities such as Deepdale.271
Similarly, the Rhode Island Development Corporation recently
attempted to use its “quick take” authority to condemn a temporary
easement in a multi-million dollar airport parking facility.272 The
development corporation argued that the condemnation’s primary
purpose was to increase the number of available parking spots.273 But,
on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out that “no
additional parking spaces were created” and that the only change in
use appeared to be that “those parking spaces previously dedicated
to valet parking simply were reallocated for daily parking.”274 Ultimately, the Court invalidated the condemnation.275
The use of eminent domain normally requires a post-condemnation
use that is at least ostensibly of greater value than the pre-condemnation
use. The problem with “same-use” takings, like the threatened condemnation of Deepdale Golf Club or the attempted condemnation of
the airport parking easement, is that these takings not only entail a
risk of disfavoritism but also have no ostensible economic benefit.276

268
See Peter Applebome, Of the Rich, Eminent Domain . . . and Golf, NY Times,
29 (Mar 26, 2006).
269
Id (quoting John Wilson).
270
Joseph A. Grundfest, Out of Bounds, NY Times 9 (Apr 16, 2006) (opining that
“the Deepdale land grab makes sense only if . . . North Hills can take the golf course
for less than 100 cents on the dollar”).
271
See Julia C. Mead, Law Shuts Door on an Open-Space Gambit, NY Times, 2
(Aug 27, 2006).
272
RI Econ Dev Corp v The Parking Co, 892 A2d 87, 91 (RI 2006).
273
Id at 105.
274
Id.
275
Id at 107-08.
276
It is doubtful whether local officials in New York would have been in the best
position to determine whether Deepdale would have a higher value as a public, rather
than private, golf course. Even if a different fee or membership plan might enhance
the parcel’s value, the course’s existing owners seemingly would have an incentive to
implement such a plan. Likewise, it is doubtful whether the redevelopment corporation in Rhode Island would be in a better position than the parking garage’s current
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Because of the possibility that the condemnor’s actual motive may
be to disfavor a particular private party, such takings also should be
considered pretextual.277
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have proposed a framework for identifying pretextual takings based on the comparative competencies of local governments and private developers. When the government lacks information regarding the optimal site for an assembly, the government may
need to rely on a private developer to identify, as well as execute,
an assembly project. However, when the government itself possesses information regarding the appropriate site, pre-condemnation
private involvement, as well as post-condemnation involvement by
a preferred private developer, is generally unnecessary.
Consequently, if a private developer is expected to obtain a distinct
benefit from a condemnation, the government should be required to

operators to determine whether valet parking spaces should be reallocated for daily
parking. Presumably, if a different allocation was more desirable, the current operators
could reconfigure the spaces accordingly.
277
There are several other types of takings in which pretext is an issue because the
condemnee is a disfavored party. In these cases, like the “same use” takings, the government, not a private party, is often the ultimate owner of the land. However, unlike
“same use” takings, the government might attempt to alter the land use to a different
use that is a traditional public use. See, for example, Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev
at 65-68 (cited in note 44) (discussing two cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court
invalidated condemnations even though the asserted public purposes were traditional
public uses (in one case, a public park; in the other, a training area for police and fire
officials)). The takings in these types of cases, however, often entail direct evidence
of a discriminatory purpose either because the condemnor is targeting individuals
on the basis of a suspect classification such as race, see, for example, Deerfield Park
Dist. v Progress Dev Corp, 174 NE2d 850 (Ill 1961) (reversing judgment of trial court
in favor of condemnor park district where condemnee had alleged in complaint that
park district had used power of eminent domain to prevent development of integrated
neighborhood in violation of the Equal Protection Clause), or religion, see, for example, Albanian Associated Fund v Twp of Wayne, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176,
2007 WL 2904194 (DNJ 2007) (denying town’s motion for summary judgment because
plaintiff alleged that attempted condemnation of mosque for purpose of establishing
“open space” was pretextual and violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000), or because the condemnor is
clearly acting in bad faith, see, for example, Borough of Essex Falls v Kessler Institute
for Rehabilitation, Inc, 673 A2d 856, 860-62 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1995) (concluding
that borough’s asserted purpose for condemning a parcel, to create additional park
land, was a mere pretext for preventing the establishment of rehabilitation facility).
Cf. Vill of Arlington Heights v Metro Hous Dev Corp, 429 US 252, 265-66 (1977)
(pointing out that “judicial deference is no longer justified” when there is “proof that
a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision”).
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provide a legitimate justification for the particular type of private
involvement at issue. Ultimately, such an approach could be implemented using a burden-shifting framework similar to the test for
identifying pretext in Title VII cases.
Without a coherent doctrinal framework, courts may still identify
certain takings as pretextual. For example, courts may view oneto-one takings or condemnations in which the post-condemnation
use is the same as the pre-condemnation use with suspicion. But most
other condemnations, including almost all assembly projects of any
considerable size, would likely invoke only minimal judicial scrutiny. Because the projected public benefits of these condemnations
are typically significant, courts would continue to defer to legislative
determinations regarding the necessity of private involvement, even
if the reasons for such private involvement are unclear.
Yet the problem with the lack of a coherent framework is not only
excessive judicial deference but also excessive judicial discretion.
Unlimited discretion would permit a court to invoke the pretextual takings doctrine selectively. A court might allow a particular
assembly of which it approves even though there is a substantial
risk of favoritism and disallow another assembly of which it disapproves even though there is little or no risk of favoritism. Developing
a jurisprudence of pretext may be necessary, therefore, to prevent the
emergence of a jurisprudence that is itself pretextual.
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